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EPS formed a Task Force on the Caucasus on 28 January 2000 in 
concluding a conference in Brussels, convened by CEPS at the 
proposal of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, 
Max Van der Stoel. With the present document the Task Force puts into 
circulation the preliminary text of a comprehensive plan for the region. 
Consultations are now being undertaken with interested parties, official and 
non-governmental, in the region and outside, in order to improve the present 
proposals operationally, and to create momentum in public debate. 
C 
A word on the title “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus” is called for. The 
Task Force has hesitated over this. Of course the substance rather than the 
name is the main point. But still, the chosen title serves to bring into the open 
some vital issues. Is the intention to copy the Balkan Stability Pact of 1999, 
or the Balladur Stability Pact of 1995? Neither, since the circumstances in 
each case are different and so must also be the mechanisms – despite some 
obvious similarities between the Balkans and the Caucasus (multi-ethnic 
“Balkanisation”, conflicts, frontiers of former empires and ancient 
civilisations).  
Still there are three features in common: 
1)  Multilateral diplomatic initiatives concerning territories that border or 
overlap the former Soviet Union and the enlarging European Union; 
2)  Normative foundations consisting of common values codified by the 
pan-European organisations (Council of Europe and OSCE); and 
3)  Complex actions that have to be based on the interests of regional 
actors, but that also depend on the economic incentives and 
peacekeeping capacities that only the major powers can deploy. 
The proposed Stability Pact for the Caucasus is perhaps closer to the Balkan 
Stability Pact, being about ethnic conflict resolution or post-conflict 
situations, rather than preventive diplomacy as with the Balladur Stability 
Pact. It is categorically different, however, in that there has been no 
significant Western military involvement, the region is entirely post-Soviet 
Union space, and the geographical proximity of the European Union is less. 
Still, the Task Force has attempted to draft a Stability Pact for the Caucasus 
with the same three common features identified above. But the combination 
of measures has to be different: more importance attached to regional 
i CEPS TASK FORCE ON THE CAUCASUS 
integration (of the South Caucasus), direct responsibilities assigned to Russia 
(Northern Caucasus), long-term perspective on integration with the EU (for 
the Southern Caucasus), agreement of the essential need for a Pact to 
establish a predominantly cooperative regime for the whole region. The latter 
would be underwritten by all the regional actors and the major external 
powers, progressively supplanting the regime of local hostilities backed by 
opposing geo-political alliances.  
There may be some fatigue with stability pacts in European diplomatic 
circles. However the following perspective is suggested. An historic task for 
the post-communist period is to stabilise the borderlands of Russia and the 
enlarging European Union. The first Stability Pact was rather successful in 
Central Europe. The second Stability Pact is work-in-progress in the 
Balkans. A third is now needed for the Caucasus, and with that, we would 
have a real chance of winning the ultimate prize of achieving stability in the 
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1. Appeals of leaders of the region 
President Demirel of Turkey proposed on 16 January 2000, that there should 
be a Stability Pact for the Caucasus.  
President Shevardnardze of Georgia has for several years been arguing in 
favour of a Peaceful Caucasus initiative. On 17 November 1999 at Istanbul, 
he proposed enhanced Black Sea Economic Cooperation, to give a balanced 
attention to economic, political and security issues and to creation of a 
BSEC-EU Cooperation Platform. 
President Aliev of Azerbaijan advocated recently that “the countries of the 
South Caucasus must enter the 21
st century free from all conflicts and 
confrontations, and accept their own Pact for Security and Peace …”. 
President Kocharian of Armenia addressed the Georgian parliament on 29 
March 2000, arguing that: 
a security pact for the Caucasus can only be effective if all states of the 




not only security and conflict resolution issues should be addressed, but 
it also should provide the basis for economic cooperation and democratic 
reforms; 
the pact should be based on a 3+3+2 agreement: i.e. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia + Russia, Iran and Turkey + US and EU. 
Georgian foreign minister Menagharishvili spoke in reply that Tbilisi 
supports all initiatives aimed at stabilising the situation in the Caucasus.   
President Aushev of Ingushetia on 30 March 2000 called upon President 
Putin to seek a political solution in dialogue with all the Caucasus leaders, 
the entire region being destabilised by the Chechnya war, in addition to the 
conflicts involving Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
In the past two years, statements favouring a renewed effort for a 
comprehensive approach to political stability and economic development 
through regional cooperation in the Caucasus were also made by the US 
Secretary of State Albright and the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov.  
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 2. EU-Russia-US to respond 
The powers are thus invited to assist in producing a durable solution to 
overcome the region’s instability. They have now a window of opportunity 
and duty to use it. It requires engineering – politically and diplomatically – a 
shift of paradigm from one reminiscent of the 19
th century to one worthy of 
the 21
st century; from one of rivalries, realpolitik, violent nationalism and 
conflict, to one of cooperation and integration based on the norms developed 
in Western Europe during the second half of the 20
th century. 
The status quo has many features of a 19
th century paradigm. There are many 
conflicts and tense oppositions in the region, from the clan to the geo-
political. The pivotal case, both in terms of local geography and geo-politics, 
is that of Nagorno-Karabakh. Behind the trenches and land-mines of no 
man’s land lies a wide set of virtual alliances, notwithstanding the efforts of 
the Minsk Group of the OSCE (co-chairs: France, Russia, US). The virtual 
alliances on the Armenian side sees support from Russia with arms and 
military bases. Iran cooperates closely with Armenia. On the Azerbaijan side 
there is political support from Turkey, which blockades Armenia. The US 
supports a line of virtual alliance from Turkey through Georgia to 
Azerbaijan, as seen in oil pipeline diplomacy. The US sanctions Iran. 
Armenia blockades the Azeri province of Nakhichevan. Russia argues that 
Georgia has not been helping stop infiltration of terrorists in and out of 
Chechnya. Abkhazia adds further frictions to the set of regional relationships. 
Both Georgia and Russia blockade Abkhazia for its attempted secession. 
Russia has at times lifted its part of the blockade, when it felt Georgia was 
not being helpful over Chechnya, whereas the illegal Chechnyan business in 
and through Abkhazia has also been widely reported. Both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan feel insecure in relation to Russia, and so discuss developing a 
stronger relationship with NATO, which further aggravates the atmosphere 
between Russia and the US. Meanwhile the economy of the whole region 
suffers. Political stalemate clearly favours the rise of extremist elements 
throughout the region. Nationalist polemics and demands for vengeance are 
intensified.  
According to a 21
st century paradigm a set of agreements over the several 
conflicts could set in motion a virtuous circle of economic, political and 
societal developments. The South Caucasus could start on the process of 
long-run convergence on the European integration model, both for intra-
regional integration and later with the EU. Political agreements would allow 
the immediate removal of blockades, triggering a restart of commercial 
exchange and more normal relations between the communities. Political 
security, if really credible, would be the signal for big investments in the oil 
and gas sector, both in production and trans-Caucasian pipelines, some of 
which should cross presently blockaded frontiers. Both in the Northern 
Caucasus and the three South Caucasus countries there are outstanding 
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natural assets and an amazingly rich cultural heritage, which are presently 
greatly under-exploited. Resources would be released from military budgets, 
to benefit social expenditures and civil infrastructure investments. Western 
aid would be undoubtedly expanded, to help in financing repair of war 
damage, and providing funds for renewal more generally. Projects to advance 
economic integration in the region are waiting for peaceful removal of 
blockades, such as railway lines presently cut: the north-south line from 
Russia through Abkhazia into the rest of Georgia, cross-border links between 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, and east-west line along the southern 
Azerbaijan and Armenian frontiers with Iran. In the Russian Northern 
Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, the growth of religious extremism and 
political terrorism has been fostered by the miserable economic conditions 
since the first Chechnyan war of 1994-95. Economic recovery in the 
Northern Caucasus is indispensable for durable peace, and this would be 
aided by progress in the Southern Caucasus.  
Reality is of course not black and white. Elements of both paradigms co-
exist, but the question is which one is to dominate. The desirable strategy has 
to engineer the shift in paradigm, from domination by 19
th century norms to 
the ascendancy of 21
st century values. The war-weariness of the region may 
now at last permit this, but nothing can happen without engagement of the 
big powers. 
Indeed, the proposed Stability Pact for the Caucasus brings into focus the 
very substance of the future relationships between the Russian Federation, 
the European Union and the United States. All three are in a position to claim 
that they have legitimate (historical or recently acquired) interests in the area 
- political, economic or strategic. Those interests, though different, are not 
necessarily divergent. Unlike the Balkan situation, the geopolitical stakes in 
the Caucasus are more clearly identifiable. The Caucasus will probably be 
the next big test for transatlantic solidarity. It is also the terrain where a new 
chapter of, hopefully, constructive cooperation can be opened between 
Russia and the West. The potential for positive action is enormous. 
Conversely, the absence of an accepted common purpose and strategic vision 
- and the failure to act accordingly - carries the danger of serious 
confrontation. In either case the consequences, good or bad, for the peoples 
of the region and the future of international relations will be considerable. 
A comprehensive approach, based on a rational balance of trade-offs and 
pay-offs, can provide viable answers to the complex issues of the region. 
Some of those problems are really difficult, some are endogenous and some 
are compounded by extraneous elements, some are pressing and some can 
wait, some have to be tackled one at a time and some have to be dealt with in 
a package, some are old and some are new. None of them is intractable. The 
ultimate beneficiaries of the proposed multilateral negotiation process will 
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have to be the peoples in that long-suffering area and their neighbours in the 
wider Black Sea–Caucasus–Caspian region. 
 3. A Stability Pact for the Caucasus 
The first Balladur Stability Pact of 1994-5 was EU preventative diplomacy to 
clear up frontier and minority problems among accession candidate 
countries, using this as a precondition for accession and therefore a strong 
incentive mechanism to settle. 
The second Balkan Stability Pact of 1999 is a soft conference mechanism. Its 
creation depended entirely on the prior NATO intervention, which led to the 
Dayton and UNSC Res.1244 peace settlements imposed on Bosnia and 
Kosovo, with the incentive of EU integration, however distant, also a factor. 
Neither of the two pacts are therefore a model for the Caucasus, where the 
conflicts are not yet settled, and where part of the region is Russian territory.  
For conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, since all three countries aspire 
to a future in modern Europe, it is suggested that one particularly valuable 
precept from European experience be observed. This would be to play down 
notions of absolute independence and sovereignty, given that Western 
Europe’s own difficult ethnic conflicts and tensions are only being resolved 
through complex systems of distribution of competences, interdependence 
and shared sovereignty. This would indeed mean a shift of paradigm for the 
Caucasus, to jump from  the 19
th  century to the 21
st.  
Concrete examples may be drawn from, amongst others, the 1998 Northern 
Ireland agreement and Belgian federalism, both in the EU setting. The 
Northern Irish agreement is characterised by multi-tier relationships between 
state entities (Ireland, UK), nations which are autonomous but non-state 
entities (Scotland, Wales), and a self-governing province (Northern Ireland). 
These relationships are in part horizontal and asymmetric (i.e. sub-state 
entities share power with states for certain powers). The words federation, 
confederation and independence do not appear. The point about Belgium is 
that it is a federation, but one in which the federal level is rather thin in 
power now as a result of devolution of powers to the EU, to the territorial 
entities and also to the separate cultural/language communities. The conflicts 
of the South Caucasus seem to be calling for solutions which could draw on 
some of these features (see 4.1 below). 
The EU and Russia can also draw on their experience in deepening the 
“Northern Dimension” to their border relations, which builds on the Baltic 
and Barents Sea cooperation (analogue of the Black Sea), and also seeks to 
develop cooperation on major economic (energy, transport) projects as well 
as highly sensitive border issues (Kaliningrad). Therefore a “Southern 
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Dimension” concept is suggested, building on existing Black Sea 
cooperation, but going further, also with the US as full partner. 
Still the overarching shift of paradigm has to be engineered and set into 
motion, and this requires a powerful impulse. Therefore an operational 
mechanism is proposed, with a variable geometry designed to provide the 
initial impetus for action, to ensure adequate coordination and monitoring of 
progress, and to lock in potentially diverging interests in a comprehensive 
cooperative enterprise at a regional level: 
A Trilateral understanding, comprising Russia, the EU and the US, 
consisting of a willingness to participate in a Stability Pact for the Caucasus, 
perhaps with 6 chapters:  
  For the Southern Caucasus Community:  
  A/ Conflict resolution and prevention 
  B/ South Caucasus Community;  
  C/ An OSCE regional security system. 
  For the wider Southern Dimension 
  D/ Russia/EU/US Southern Dimension cooperation 
  E/ Broader Black Sea – Caucasus – Caspian cooperation 
  F/ Oil and gas investment and related infrastructure. 
The Trilateral would then propose this agenda to a Caucasus Contact Group. 
This would of course include Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, who in turn 
might wish to invite  their direct neighbours, Turkey (acknowledging 
President’s Demirel’s initiative), and Iran (supposing a will to join a broadly 
cooperative scheme), making perhaps a Group of 8.  
It would be clear from the beginning that the wider agenda of six chapters 
could only proceed with assurance of political settlements of the conflicts. 
The prospect of the wider agenda would increase the incentives to settle, but 
the substance would not be pre-negotiated. On the contrary the wider agenda 
would follow, otherwise the negotiations to settle the conflicts would risk 
getting bogged down deeper and deeper. 
According to the topic additional players would of course be involved: the 
OSCE/ UN for conflict resolution and regional security arrangements; the 
Council of Europe for human and minority rights, the international financial 
institutions (IMF, IBRD, EBRD) as required, and autonomous entities such 
as Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh where their vital interests are directly 
concerned. However this extended participation would be organised on an ad 
hoc basis, rather than by creating a very large, formal, plenary structure, such 
as the Balkan Stability Pact. 
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The broader Black Sea – Caucasus – Caspian dimension, bringing in all 
countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, would be based on the existing 
mechanism of the Organisation for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) of which the countries of the Caucasus are members. The BSEC 
organisation itself would be upgraded in operationality, with full 
membership now appropriate for the EU in view of the status of Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey as accession candidates, and possible association links 
with the South Caucasus. There would be a Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian 
Political Forum (BCC) for actions and consultations which by their nature 
should include all countries of the region as well as the EU and US.  
The Trilateral would also develop a specific understanding on how the EU 
and US might make “best efforts” contributions to ease the very difficult 
problems of the Russian Northern Caucasus. 
4. South Caucasus Community 
4.1 South Caucasus conflict resolution and prevention 
Hachapuri recipes
1. The vocabulary of independence, sovereignty, federation 
and confederation sometimes bedevils the search for solutions in the 
Caucasus. It is proposed to make only limited use of such contested terms, 
and to focus instead on the mechanisms of governance and constitutions 
appropriate for complex multi-ethnic communities such as the Caucasus, the 
Balkans and indeed much of Western Europe. The  European model, which 
the South Caucasus may at some stage join, is about shared sovereignty, 
coordination, cooperation, equality between national communities and 
cultures, interdependence, and multi-tier (sometimes asymmetric
2) structures 
of governance. Precise recipes for the Caucasus will be indigenous 
(Hachapuri) and specific for each case, but should have common features, 
and also could be enriched by a judicious use of some current ingredients 
from Northern Irish, Belgian, South Tyrol, Aland Islands etc. Concretely a 
schema of how competences may be shared by level of government is 
suggested in Box 1. This is a reference, or a tool-kit, or basis on which 
individual cases may be discussed - not a universal recommendation. The 
general idea is to work for solutions that avoid violent or unagreed changes 
in state frontiers. Obviously enough, the Caucasus region has demonstrated 
already its potential for escalating violence (see Annex B). Its potential for 
further escalation of ethnic violence and cleansing as seen in the Balkans 
                                                           
1 Hachapuri is a fine Caucasian cheese-cake, primarily Georgian, much 
appreciated in Abkhazia, with Armenian recipe variants, also appreciated in 
Baku. 
2 “Asymmetric” in this context means that entities of different constitutional 
status (states, federated states, regions) may share certain policy competences in 
a non-hierarchical manner.  
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surely exists too. This is why the search for other solutions, even if 
complicated, is imperative.  
Box 1. Tool-kit on the distribution of competences among self-governing 
            entities. 
Constitution. Federated states and republics would write their own constitutions,
subject to not contradicting state competence. There would be no provision for
secession without agreement of the state and the entity. The distribution of
comptences and coordination between the different levels of governance would
be regulated so as to minimise conflicts and tensions (e.g. in the Belgian federal
system it has been found easier to regulate a multi-ethnic system with exclusive
rather than shared competences).   
South Caucasus Community (SCC) dimension (see 4.2 below). This would 
introduce a new tier of economic powers and political integration, diluting 
traditional conflicts, leading also to the perspective of European integration.  
Horizontal and asymmetric relations between entities. Black and white ideas of 
independence versus subordination would be diluted in a more complex set of 
relationships between entities, including some horizontal relations between the 
different levels of governance, including the possibility for self-governing 
political units to establish relations with foreign states in their fields of 
competence (see below). This possibility may include in certain cases treaty-
making powers. 
Citizenship. Passports would carry designation “South Caucasus Community”, 
then a state identity “Armenia/Azerbaijan/Georgia”, then in exceptional cases, 
when provided in the peace agreement, the indication of a specific citizenship 
of political entities such as Abkhazia or Nagorno Karabakh. Dual nationality 
(“state identity”) would be possible. Residents of entities with important 
communities of another state (e.g. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh) would be 
free to choose either or both state identity. 
Defense, security and police. Entities warranting a high degree of autonomy 
may have territorial armed forces, of multi-ethnic/non-discriminatory 
composition. Entities recently at war would be subject to specific security 
agreements and guarantees of the OSCE, and this would condition the 
prerogatives of territorial commanders (e.g. to safeguard the rights of refugees 
and displaced persons). The armed forces of these entities would also be 
included in the activities of international security organisations, such as the 
OSCE. Police would be an entity competence, subject to security guarantees for 
all ethnic communities.  
External relations. Membership of UN and international organisations and 
international diplomatic recognition an exclusive prerogative of the state, which 
does not exclude a certain access to these organisations of other entities. In 
matters of entity competence, direct relations with third countries and 
international organisations. Representations in third countries of such entities as 
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Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria or Nagorno Karabakh possible, for instance 
as  identified members of state diplomatic missions. Frameworks for 
cooperation and joint projects between entities and with states possible in such 
fields as education, culture, language, sport and youth if these are within the 
scope of the entity’ competences. This should be possible within the SCC, as 
with related communities in Russia, Turkey and Iran. 
Currency and monetary policy. Competence of state, until and unless 
international currency adopted (e.g.euro). Purely symbolic differences in 
banknotes possible, but an expensive luxury (as in Belgium-Luxembourg).  
Trade policy. Tariffs and/or free trade regimes, competence of the state, until 
and unless becomes a South Caucasus Community policy, possibly with special 
agreements with EU customs union (i.e. including Turkey) and Russia. 
Taxation and public expenditure. Degree of decentralisation to entity level 
depends on size of entity. Public infrastructure for inter-regional and 
international transport, telecommunications and pipelines requires concertation 
at all levels: South Caucasus Community/bilateral/state/entity. 
Nagorno Karabakh (NK). Proposals made within the context of the OSCE 
Minsk Group negotiations have included concepts of common statehood, 
horizontal ties between NK and Azerbaijan, a recognition de jure of NK’s 
status as part of Azerbaijan while allowing NK self-government and a 
significant number of competences. An eventual solution to the conflict will 
have to find some combination of these Minsk Group proposals together with 
other elements in order to be accepted by political leaders in the two 
countries and to stand a reasonable chance of being ratified by their 
respective legislative branches of government. 
Most independent analysts agree that the current situation (technically, a 
state of war) cannot endure indefinitely and that, sooner or later, it may lead 
to another armed confrontation. In fact, the resolution of the NK conflict, the 
only one in the region which directly opposes two sovereign entities, is the 
key to any meaningful progress toward a regional security and co-operation 
arrangement. The stalemate has so far favoured the ascent of  more radical 
elements in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It has fueled a propaganda war 
and an escalating regional arms race. The adverse impact on the democratic 
process, socio-economic development and much needed foreign investment 
in the two countries has been serious. In addition, the conflict continues to 
affect perversely Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s relations with the neighbouring 
countries and the rest of the world. 
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To break the deadlock a renewed effort is required of the Minsk Group, 
together with the parties concerned, to resolve the NK conflict in a single 
package, with the following elements:  
Territorial questions, including withdrawal from occupied territories, 
coupled with appropriate constitutional dispositions regarding the legal 







Replacing the cease-fire with a permanent legally binding agreement, 
either bilateral or trilateral (including also Georgia), with adequate 
international guarantees; transitional arrangements including the 
mandate and composition of an international peace keeping mission; 
Return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees with proper 
safeguards and generous international funding; 
Special dispositions concerning post-war rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, economic and human development in a regional format; 
A clear commitment to the values of pluralistic democracy, good 
governance, human and minority rights, rule of law, and market-driven 
prosperity.  
The multi-level type of integration to be achieved in the SCC would give 
increased possibilities for Nagorno Karabakh to cooperate with Armenia in 
the fields of their competences, without threatening the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan. 
Abkhazia. Georgia proposed a new federal constitution in July 1999, hoping 
to accommodate demands for increased Abkhazian autonomy. Abkhazia 
replied in October 1999 with a declaration of independence. Earlier 
proposals for a common state represent an intermediate position and are a 
basis for our further comment. The term “common state” is used to identify 
an equal rank for Abkhazia in a state which it shares with Georgia. There 
would be only one state represented in the UN and recognised internationally 
as such. There would be a “federal” budget and taxes etc. of the common 
state. There would also be far-reaching decentralisation and needs for 
coordination of policy in various domains. 
There have also been proposals for Pan-Caucasian institutions, drawing on 
European models, both of the EU institutions and the “Europe of the regions” 
idea. This has much in common with the SCC proposal. We would however 
suggest keeping the SCC to the South Caucasus. Whereas a Pan-Caucasus 
entity with the North Caucasus entities of Russia has been advocated 
implausibly (in our view), we could envisage special cooperation between 
the SCC and the Russian Northern Caucasus.  
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In the case of Abkhazia, the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
reconstruction and de-blockading are all inextricably linked. From a pre-war 
population of 537,000 the two-year war led to more than 200,000 displaced 
persons, and extensive destruction. Comparative analysis with Bosnia and 
Kosovo suggest that up to $ ½ billion would be needed to cover 
reconstruction expenses. The Russian and Georgian economic blockades 
have prevented Abkhazia from economic recovery. It has a number of 
important economic assets, such as its previously prosperous tourism 
industry, its export of subtropical goods such as wine and hazelnuts, and its 
commerce though the port of Sukhumi.  
Although the absence of refugee repatriation is partly the result of the 
Abkhaz perception of threat by a massive inflow of ethnic Georgian 
displaced persons, it is also critically linked to the absence of reconstruction 
in turn connected to the persisting economic blockades on the region. 
Without serious reconstruction efforts in rebuilding homes and 
reconstructing roads, hospitals and schools, Abkhazia could not function 
with its pre-war population, i.e. double its population of today. 
Reconstruction would allow the repatriation of refugees mainly of Georgian 
origin to Abkhazia. Refugee repatriation in turn would reduce Georgia’s 
economic strain allowing Tbilisi, together with authorities in Abkhazia, to 
join with international agencies in financing of reconstruction efforts. 
South Ossetia. Conflict in South Ossetia has in recent years been defused 
through  confidence-building measures, the reopening of communication 
links with Georgia and the agreement between conflicting parties on the non-
use of force, refugee repatriation and demilitarisation. However, the 
constitutional delimitation of powers remains the major issue of 
disagreement, which could in future trigger renewed armed conflict. Recent 
Georgian proposals suggest constitutional amendments recognising South 
Ossetian representative executive and legal bodies. On the other hand, South 
Ossetia calls for a union with North Ossetia under the Russian Federation, 
with competence in foreign, economic, trade and cultural affairs. In between 
these opposed positions, Russia has made proposals which could be useful in 
working out a settlement. Some of these ideas, together with the present 
document’s proposal for a South Caucasus Community, are reflected in the 
following: 
South Ossetian self-government within a Georgia federation could be 
exercised in the following areas: culture, education and tourism, as well 
as in local transport, environmental affairs, local taxation, social policy, 
health and urban/rural development. Some degree of competence in 
economic policy could also be envisaged. Democratic accountability 
would call for a local parliament with decision-making powers in the 
above legislative areas. South Ossetia would also be represented as a 
distinct federated state within a SCC Assembly.  
• 
 10A STABILITY PACT FOR THE CAUCASUS 
North-South Ossetian relations. North-South Ossetian relations could be 
articulated within the forum of pan-Caucasian cooperation between the 
SCC and Russia thus not threatening Georgia’s territorial integrity. 
North-South Ossetian relations could cover both issues such as refugee 
return and transport links, and other matters such as education, language 
and cultural affairs. 
• 
Adjaria. Tensions between the Republic of Adjaria and Tbilisi have been 
reflected in power struggles, which however have avoided explicit conflict. 
Yet a smoother and less uncertain future of the region requires a 
constitutional settlement along federal principles. The very recent agreement 
between Presidents Shevardnadze and Abashidze suggests that such a 
settlement could be now in sight. The Georgian parliament has recently 
passed a special decree reconfirming Adjaria’s autonomy. The  constitutional 
amendment to give this effect is still unknown. However one could envisage 
some degree of Adjarian autonomy, and more constructive economic 
cooperation between Tbilisi and Batumi. Adjaria’s political autonomy could 
be exercised in linguistic and religious affairs in the light of the widespread 
Islamisation and use of the Türki language in the region. In these matters of 
competence, Adjaria would be represented as a federated state within a South 
Caucasian Political Assembly, with cultural links with related Turkish 
communities. Adjaria could also be granted some economic autonomy with 
respects to the port of Batumi, and would be called to ensure the payment of 
federal taxes to Tbilisi. Georgia, remaining in control of other areas of 
economic policy-making, would assure a due place for Adjaria in 
infrastructure projects integrated within the framework of South Caucasus 
initiatives.  
Javakheti. Although Javakheti never erupted as a violent conflict, important 
issues of contention need to be addressed. The Armenians of Javakheti call 
for a constitutional settlement in which Javakheti would manage its own 
cultural affairs, while Tbilisi is keen to retain Javakheti within the same 
administrative unit as Meskheti. In this case competences could be 
distributed between two local governments, one dealing with competences 
having clearly territorial dimensions (economy, transport, infrastructure, 
ecology), and the second with competences linked to cultural identities 
(education and culture). The first government (and assembly) would be 
constituted on a multi-ethnic basis; for the second however the Armenian 
community would be able to manage their “cultural” affairs within the 
Meskheti-Javakheti unit. (Such a system has a precedent in Belgium, where 
the small German language community has exclusive jurisdiction over 
“cultural” matters, whereas territorial competence are exercised by the 
Walloon region). Furthermore, representation within a SCC parliament 
would enable the Armenian Javakhetis to articulate their relations with 
Armenia in a comprehensive way within an all-encompassing regional 
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structure. The Georgian state, remaining in charge of the economic policy, 
would be called to prioritise the development of Javakheti, in the light of the 
latter’s disproportionately poor economic performance.  
The Lezghins. Since 1993/94, the potential conflict between the Lezghin 
population and Azerbaijan appears to have been capped. Nonetheless the 
possibility of future trouble remains. Hence, the need to address 
constitutionally the rights of the Lezghin people. As in the case of Adjaria, 
Ossetia and Javakheti in Georgia, the Constitution of Azerbaijan should 
allow some degree of autonomy in cultural, linguistic and educational 
spheres to its Lezghin population in the north-east. The latter should also be 
allowed representation within an SCC Parliamentary Assembly. Pan-
Caucasian cooperation should provide the forum within which Lezghins 
across international borders articulate their relations in social, cultural and 
educational spheres.  
Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan’s constitutional provisions on the status 
Nakhichevan as an autonomous republic appear to have satisfied local 
political demands. Hence, retaining the existing constitutional model, 
Nakhichevan could be represented separately both within a SCC 
Parliamentary Assembly and in other SCC forums of policy cooperation 
dealing with the republic’s fields of competence. 
4.2 South Caucasus regional integration  
Once there are clear signs of progress towards resolving the most serious 
regional conflicts, especially Nagorno-Karabakh, the South Caucasus could 
take up the obvious opportunities for beneficial regional economic 
integration, and later increasing integration with the EU. Assuming that the 
three countries wanted to strengthen their aspirations for a European 
vocation, there would be every reason to have in mind some well-established 
integration models. The EU for its part could see intra-regional integration as 
a stage on the way towards the region’s European vocation (as the joint EU-
South Caucasus summit declaration of June 1999 already hints). 
South Caucasus Community. The comparable size and economic geography 
of the three states, and a presumed will to establish a constructive post-war 
order, makes an ultimately ambitious plan for regional integration 
conceivable. The three states could take an initiative, called perhaps the 
“South Caucasus Community” (SCC), which would start with obviously 
useful initiatives, but aim at continuously deepening integration. The process 
could be sponsored and assisted by the EU in view of its unique experience 
of multi-national integration, and the possibility of linkage of the SCC later 
to the EU.  
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Assuming that the conflicts were resolved, there could be a fresh approach to 
the region’s integration, especially within the Southern Caucasus, but not 
neglecting both pan-Caucasus and EU aspects. 
There is moreover an extensive world-wide experience of regional 
integration initiatives, which are summarised in Inset B. This shows that the 
EU model, although by far the most developed, is certainly not the only one 
to bear in mind. These different models highlight a number of questions of 
strategic design. 
First is the question of priority as between economic, political and security 
objectives Second there is the related but different question of sequencing of 
initiatives and the logic of the process.  
The EEC/EU is only one example. Here the objective is political integration 
and security through making war unthinkable, while economic integration 
was the first step in the process, aiming to achieve political objectives by 
creating material interdependence. On the other hand ASEAN began as an 
association to pursue common security objectives, and only later turned to 
trade integration. EFTA has been a purely economic action, but its lack of 
political integration structures provoked a subsequent preference by most 
members to switch to the EEC/EU. APEC aims at bringing an enormous and 
highly divergent group of countries – from China to the US – closer together 
through trade liberalisation. The first Stability Pact (Balladur) aimed 
essentially at preventive diplomacy with respect to ethnic/frontier questions, 
whereas the second Stability Pact (Balkan) is a loose framework for 
cooperation over economic, political and security issues, following the 
Bosnia and Kosovo wars and peace agreements, with an interim period ahead 
of unknown duration before the ultimate objective of EU integration. These 
examples suffice to suggest that one needs to work out very deliberately what 
the objectives, mechanisms and strategy should be, rather than copy some 
supposedly standard package. 
  
Inset B: Tool-kit for regional integration 
EEC - Monnet method to start. From the early days of European integration, 
when memories of war were still very fresh, the idea was to start with some 
vivid and concrete action in selected sectors, to begin to learn by doing. The 
European Coal and Steel Community was the action, with member states 
relinquishing powers to common institutions initially just in this field. 
EU model. Highly developed model, uniquely so. Objective: comprehensive, 
supranational integration, open-ended destination. Sequential accumulation 
of competences: trade, single market, monetary, foreign policy, justice/home 
affairs, and defense. Full institutional structure: Council, Commission, 
Parliament, Court of Justice, Economic and Social Committee, Committee of 
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Regions. Full legislative capacities. Evolutionary institutional system: voting 
system moves progressively from unanimity to majority. 
EFTA. Purely free trade agreement. Small secretariat. Minimalist conception 
of economic  integration, initially competing with political integration model 
of EEC. Most members left for EEC/EU. 
CEFTA. Central and South East European candidates for EU accession make 
free trade area between themselves as transitional step before accession. 
Baltic/Barents/Black Sea cooperation. Highly heterogeneous groupings, 
united by geography. Extensive soft cooperation/contacts/confidence 
building. Attempts to deepen cooperation on energy, environment. Not 
competent for main trade or security policy issues. 
ASEAN (South East Asian states). Began in 1967 as foreign ministers’ club. 
Primary security concern (China). Common diplomacy in multilateral 
security debate. Relations with US, EU. ASEAN Free Trade Area only in the 
1990s. Little legal base, not even treaty. 
APEC Asian and Pacific states, including China, Japan and US. Aims at free 
trade by 2010/2020.   
Mercosur (4: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay). Free trade area, with 
partial customs union (common external tariff with holes). Purely economic, 
no political/security content. Small secretariat; wholly inter-governmental. 
No monetary integration (Argentina prefers dollarisation).  
NAFTA (3: US, Canada, Mexico). Free trade, also aiming at liberalising 
foreign investment and services. No custom union or monetary integration. 
No institutions. Labour and environmental standards, with mechanism of 
judical appeal. N.B. involves two highly developed and one developing 
country. 
CIS. Formed to limit disintegration of former Soviet Union. Economic, 
political and security aspects. Many political decisions lacking 
implementation. Institutions loosely modeled as shadow of EU, but little 
legal order or clear core functions. EU model does not fit because of size of 
Russia relative to others, and weakness of legal order. Tariff free trade and 
customs union sub-grouping.  
Stability Pact # 1 (Balladur). Facilitated settlement of ethnic minority and 
related frontier issues in sub-regions, with incentive of EU membership if 
successful.  
Stability Pact # 2 (Balkan). Framework for cooperation in economics, 
democracy and security. Regional integration potential limited by 
Yugoslavia heritage. Perspectives for EU integration for all, but distant for 
some.  







For the SCC one might for example think in terms of the following priorities: 
-  Short-run priority # 1: Security – support political settlements of 
conflicts, even on an interim basis, with a credible system of security 
guarantees, with external peace-keeping presence for some time, and some 
security cooperation with regional neighbours. 
-  Short-term priority # 2: Economic - re-establish the normal workings of 
the economy of the region, removing blockades, giving effect to free trade, 
establishing sound transport infrastructures and correct cross-border 
administrative procedures. 
-  Long-term objective: Join modern European political standards – this 
will come about only with a long process of economic, societal and 
institutional development. However a path would best be sketched out from 
the beginning, and the prospect of future anchorage into the EU system may 
be important for the design and support of the process. 
 
The short-term priorities 1 and 2 would go together, each positive step in 
dealing with the political/security matters being accompanied by practical 
measures for improving the economic situation. 
 
The SCC could at an early stage be mandated to prepare the ground for 
cooperation on matters of security policies, both for making regional 
contributions to the peace-keeping task (see 4.3 below), and for combating 
cross-border crime.  
 
However the SCC would surely move immediately on the most urgent tasks 
of re-opening frontiers for normal trade, both internally and externally, and 
upgrading the regional transport infrastructures and frontier/customs 
facilities. Fortunately, the TRACECA and INOGATE networks of projects 
supported by the EU (through the Tacis programme) are an ideal basis on 
which to proceed, with many plans available for early execution. In fact, 
those two programmes could be leading vehicles for the EU to promote 
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common mechanisms and standards for regional integration. The obvious 
material advantages for all the parties concerned would provide additional 
incentives for developing regional organisational structures, which have 
already begun with a TRACECA office in Baku, and a Regional 
Environment Centre in Tbilisi. The EU could welcome the outbreak of peace 
and inception of the SCC by switching on availability of large-scale 
investment financing from the European Investment Bank to complement 
existing grant-funded technical assistance, and the IBRD and EBRD would 
naturally be able to rise to the occasion also with expanded programmes. 
 
The SCC would then examine its policy options and objectives for trade 
policy. In theory the region shares tariff free trade through the CIS, both with 
Russia and between the three South Caucasus states. However in practice this 
does not mean much in a region divided by blockades, both within the 
Southern Caucasus (between Armenia and Azerbaijan), within Georgia 
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Inset C: Tool-kit of regional trading arrangements 
 
Normal trading relationships: among WTO members states tariff levels are bound at most favoured 
nation rates (MFN). Other conditions of trade obey WTO rules.  WTO accession: Armenia, expected 
to conclude negotiations in 2000; Azerbaijan, envisaged for 2002; Georgia, negotiations concluded, to 
ratify soon in 2000. In the meantime the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) between the 
EU and the three states provide for MFN tariff regime in advance of WTO accession.  
Transit and logistical arrangements within region. This is what TRACECA has been doing.  Example: 
TIR system for permitting containers to be transported through countries without customs duties or 
opening of sealed containers (EU provides assistance to prepare this).  
Partial preferential regimes. This would be for limited agreements for exchanging tariff concessions. 
Problem: not allowed under WTO. 
Preferential arrangements for border regions. WTO allows special arrangements that facilitate 
localised trade across borders. “Export Processing Zones”, usually on sea-coasts, may allow for a 
limited zone to import, process and re-export goods free of customs duties and other taxes. However 
the zone is not fully integrated into the inland economy. 
Free trade within region. Allowed under WTO as long as it covers substantially all sectors (see next 
on CIS). Armenian-Azerbaijan trade blockaded by war.  
Free trade within CIS. The South Caucasus states are part of CIS free trade arrangements, but these 
are subject to numerous exceptions and may not be WTO compatible.  
Free trade – without cumulation of rules of origin. The countries of the region might at some stage 
make a free trade agreement with the EU. However under a first variant each would be treated 
bilaterally for the purpose of rules of origin (see next).  
Free trade – with cumulation of rules of origin. Rules of origin require that goods are substantially 
transformed in the free trade partner country, not just imported from another country outside the free 
trade agreement, and re-exported. “Cumulation of value-added” allows for a production process that 
cascades between countries of the free trade area, thus “cumulating” a sufficient transformation of the 
product to meet the “rule of origin” in the region as a whole, not just in a single country. This second 
multilateral variant can become important for the economic integration of a region, even if intra-
regional trade may remain relatively small for the SCC. 
Free trade with EU. The PCAs make no provision for opening of negotiations for free trade with the 
EU, unlike the PCAs with Russia and Ukraine (but these provisions are not yet activated). However a 
multilateral free trade agreement between the EU and the South Caucasus is an obvious policy option 
at some stage. 
Customs union. This requires adopting a common external tariff. Turkey now shares a customs union 
with the EU. The three South Caucasus states have not joined the customs union of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Khyrgizia and Tadjikistan. 
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Single market. This requires a comprehensive harmonisation of product and safety standards and 
regulatory requirements for service sectors such as banking. This is needed for complete freedom from 
internal barriers, such as achieved in the EU with the 1992 programme, and between the EU and some 







The three SCC states would surely seek to conclude their WTO accessions as 
rapidly as possible. However there then opens up a wide menu of further 
trade policy options, as summarised in Inset C. A possible sequence of 
actions could be: 1/ make a SCC free trade area, compatible with WTO; 2/ 
bring SCC trade policies with CIS countries into a state of WTO 
compatibility, with either WTO-compatible free trade, or if not reversion to 
standard WTO most-favoured nation regime; 3/ examine the scenario of SCC 
free trade with the EU/Turkey customs union. 
 
The SCC may wish set up an Economic Policy Committee or Council. 
Matters such as cooperation over excise taxation (smuggling/evasion) would 
be likely early topics. Monetary policy would initially be subject to exchange 
of information and analysis, including matters of mutual currency 
convertibility. Monetary integration, in the sense of moving to a common 
SCC currency, should not be on the agenda. In the long-run the use of the 
euro in the region could become important. Initially the euro will become a 
second parallel currency alongside the dollar for private transactions. The 
SCC monetary authorities would follow closely the developing interest 
world-wide in either dollarisation or euro-isation as currency regime (i.e. 
total replacement of the national currency with a world class money). 
 
The SCC would have a Council or governmental structure, perhaps following 
EU lines: Councils of Ministers for “pillars 1,2,3” - economic, foreign policy 
and police/justice/immigration policies, and a Summit level; a Court of 
Justice (with linkage to the EU Court) later, as and when the Council began 
to legislate.  
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The institutional structure should be consistent with the constitutional 
content of the peace agreement over Nagorno-Karabakh and the special 
arrangements for Abkhazia and other sub-state entities. To this end some 
inspiration could be drawn from two models – the Northern Ireland 
Agreement (see Annex G) and Belgian federalism within the EU setting. 
These two models allow for multi-tier structures, in which for certain fields 
of competence sub-state and state entities cooperate horizontally together, 
and in other instances there are competences devolved to cultural/language 
communities that overlap regional and state frontiers. In these ways there is 
much sharing of sovereignty and much interdependence, and notions of 
independence are diluted with multiple affiliations (including passports 
which can combine supra-national, nation-state and national but sub-state 
identities).  
 
There would also be a South Caucasus Assembly, with two parts: 
-  Parliamentary Assembly about 170 members (1 per 100 000 inhabitants), 
elected by a list system or transferable vote for sub-national constituencies of 
up to ten members, so as to assure representation of minority communities. 
The advantage of going straight away to direct elections would be to 
overcome or bypass the sensitive issue of representation of members 
designated by national and sub-national entities. 
-  Civil Assembly, for NGO interest groups and professional elites. 
Analogous to EU Economic and Social Committee or Northern Irish Civic 
Forum. Representatives could include professional and business associations, 
leaders of educational establishments, non-government organisations 
working for development of civil society, religious leaders, and leaders of 
regions and peoples. 
 
The key objective here would be to begin building institutions capable to 
developing a trans-national view of the interests and priorities of the South 
Caucasus region as a whole. Their role would be consultative in the first 
instance. The methods of election or designation should avoid issues of 
hierarchy between levels of state and sub-state government, or unresolved 
constitutional issues within or between states.  
 
Cooperation over the broad area of justice and home affairs, and including 
policies on the movement of persons, immigration and freedoms to reside 
and work, as well as for combating crime and corruption, would be a natural 
priority for the SCC.  
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EU integration perspectives. The new model of Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements, as developed for the Western Balkans could be offered, with 
proper adaptations, as a perspective for the Southern Caucasus, which would 
be conditional on progress in intra-regional integration. Once the conflicts 
are resolved politically, the prospects for these three countries to work 
together should be relatively favourable: economic geography and the 
comparable size of the three states suggest this. Institutional links would be 
organised between the SCC bodies and their EU counterparts.  
 
Comparable programmes in the all three SCC could be developed for the 
promotion of good governance, with support from the EU, OSCE, Council of 
Europe and other relevant organisations. Once the operational practices and 
procedures are perceived to be similar, it will be much easier for those 
institutions to work together in a regional mode. Such an approach would 
also facilitate the gradual capacity building for the implementation of 
regional projects and for the eventual absorption of selected portions of the 
acquis communautaire. The three countries of the SCC could be encouraged 
to prepare National Strategies for Sustainable Development according to a 
single methodology, combining economic policy  targets and environmental 
concerns in a congruent manner, which would gradually ensure compliance 
with their own international commitments and accepted European standards.  
 
Pan-Caucasus relations. The SCC would of course develop cooperative 
relations with Russia and its Northern Caucasus entities in a mutually agreed 
manner. Specific cooperative arrangements would be fostered between 
culturally linked entities that straddle the North and South Caucasus 
(Abkhazia-Adygeya, North and South Ossetia, and the Lezghin communities 
on both sides of the Dagestan-Azeri frontier).  
 
 
4.3 South Caucasus regional security system 
 
The present situation is a hybrid and contradictory regime. All states of the 
region are full members of the United Nations. They are also OSCE 
members, share its codes and obligations, participate on a basis of consensus 
in its policy decisions and contribute to various operational tasks. All states 
of the region also are participants in the NATO sponsored Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace programme of activities, 
involving joint exercises, seminars etc. On the other hand Armenia, but not 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, participates in CIS military cooperation together 
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with Russia, Kazakhstan, Khyrgizia and Tadjikistan. For their part 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, but not Armenia, talk in political speeches about 
stronger relationships with NATO (possibly membership, bases). And, of 
course, as the hinge of this binary opposition of virtual alliance systems, 
there is the confrontation of Armenian and Azeri front-line trenches in and 
around Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
Both the common OSCE and the binary alliance systems are live realities. 
The overarching question for the security system of the region is whether one 
of these two contradictory systems will grow and become the dominant 
system with the other fading away into lesser significance, or whether a tense 
confusion of interests and institutions carries on indefinitely.    
 
The cost of the present confusion of systems is that the parties to the 
conflicts of the region are themselves not receiving clear incentives and 
pressures to settle. Each has, more or less, its big protector. Apart from 
Nagorno-Karabakh, also in the case of Abkhazia there would seem also to be 
confused implicit signals to the region’s leadership. The costs of non-
settlement of the conflicts are enormous. They consist of: 
-  (a) for much of the population of the region this spells impoverishment, 
falling  living standards, and dim prospects for strong economic recovery; 
-  (b) for the big powers there remains a zone of instability with potential 
for escalation of tensions and conflicts, reducing or endangering the value of 
the oil and gas sector in the region; 
-  (c) for the neighbouring states or regions of the Black and Caspian Seas, 
Southern Russia and Central Asia there is damage to the economic 
development prospects of the whole wider area, in particular by inhibiting or 
delaying the implementation of major inter-regional infrastructure 
programmes.  
 
These are also the reasons why all parties in the region and the big powers 
alike might be able to discern a convergence of interests in engineering a 
comprehensive regional political settlement. This would mean, concretely, 
that a common security order for the Southern Caucasus should become the 
dominant feature of further joint action.   
 
OSCE regime. Therefore, as the peace settlements for Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Abkhazia and other conflict areas are being worked out, a comprehensive 
regional security system should be defined. There is the issue of choice of 
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organisation to sponsor the system, with several candidates in theory: UN, 
OSCE, NATO, CIS, EU.   
 
The lead organisation, or sponsoring organisation, should probably be 
OSCE. The UN is invaluable in providing the mandate and international 
legitimacy for specific peace-keeping operations. But OSCE has the role of 
security organisation and system for a common European house. The two can 
work together, in the sense that specific operations have legal bases, which 
can contain a consistent cascade of references to general principles and 
specific terms of reference relating to both UN and OSCE. The standard 
OSCE principles would apply, in particular with regard to the inviolability of 
state frontiers, with changes to be made only by agreement of all parties, 
reinforced by a set of confidence and stability building measures and by 
appropriate international guarantees. 
 
UN peace-keeping functions in Abkhazia could be transferred or mandated to 
OSCE in the interest of a more coherent institutional organisation in the 
region.  
 
The enhanced OSCE regime would reverse recent tendencies towards a 
stand-off between CIS and NATO activities or implicit alliances. Neither 
CIS nor NATO would be generally acceptable lead organisations. Both 
NATO and CIS sponsor military cooperation. NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
includes all states of the region, including Russia, but this is limited to 
modest cooperative activities at present. As regards the aspirations voiced in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia for future NATO membership, there is no sign 
whatsoever that NATO wishes to extend itself into the South Caucasus 
region as regards enlargement for full membership with its entailed formal 
collective defense guarantees. On the contrary NATO appears to discourage 
such aspirations. This is in itself a helpful factor, with a view to working 
towards an OSCE sponsored regional system. The EU’s security and defense 




Inset D: Tool-kit for security mechanisms 
 
Security guarantees. 
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NATO. Article 5 makes an attack on one member an attack on all. (No application for the Caucasus 
envisaged). 
CIS. Tashkent Agreement of 1992 says that aggression against one member is an aggression against 
all. Armenia was founder member of Tashkent Agreement. Azerbaijan and Georgia joined some of its 
elements in 1993. Russia did not allow Azerbaijan to activate the collective defence provision in 1993 
over Nagorno-Karabakh on grounds that it only applied to external challenges to the CIS area.   
Turkey and Nakhichevan. The Treaty of 1921 signed by Lenin and Ataturk governed the status of 
Nakhichevan as an autonomous protectorate of Azerbaijan. During the Karabakh war, Armenia began 
attacking the Nakhichevani village of Sadarak. In response some prominent personalities in Turkish 
politics urged Turkey to intervene on the grounds that the 1921 Treaty gave the right to do so, but the 
text does not make this clear. Ultimately the use of force was ruled out, but the threat of Turkish 
invasion warned off the Armenian offensive.   
Neutrality guarantees. European history has several examples of territories lying between or near the 
great powers being subject to neutrality guaranteed by allied or competing powers: Switzerland in 
1815; Belgium 1830/31; Sweden and Norway in 1855; Black Sea in 1856, Austria in 1955.  
Peace-keeping 
UN. May provide the mandate for peace-keeping operations and either operate them or mandate others 
to do so. 
OSCE. Used to observer missions, e.g. on very large scale in Kosovo in early 1999, or on small scale 
now on Russia/Chechnya/Georgia frontier. OSCE observer and monitoring mission in Nagorno 
Karabakh. Istanbul summit of November 1999 allows for possible peace-keeping role, or to provide 
mandate for peace-keeping by others (member states or other organisations to provide resources and 
expertise). An OSCE High Level Planning Group (HLPG) exists to prepare the execution of OSCE 
peacekeeping missions.  
NATO. Operates heavy peace-keeping missions in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR), in both cases 
with UN mandates, coordinates large assembly of NATO and non-NATO PfP contingents, including 
Russia under autonomous command arrangement.  
CIS. Operates current peace-keeping/blockade of Abkhazia with UN auspices, with UN observers. 
EU. Rapid Reaction Force in the making for 2003. Political/military command and control system 




  Nature of security guarantees. The states of the region are calling for 
security guarantees as a matter of priority. What could this mean concretely? 
While both CIS and NATO have formal collective defense mechanisms in 
their statutes, for reasons mentioned neither are offering the desired security 
service for the Southern Caucasus. Both organisations would be doing “too 
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much”, either in terms of political acceptability and/or of being over-
extended, if they were to undertake such formal security guarantees.  
 
A more specific security agreement or treaty, or set of agreements or treaties 
would seem however more appropriate. When the conflicts of the region 
yield to specific solutions (as discussed in the preceding sections), these 
would define the security aspects, including questions of territories, 
guarantees of the rights of ethnic communities, constitutional arrangements 
and matters of civilian and military security cooperation. Such agreements 
and/or treaties could receive appropriate degrees of endorsement and support 
(political, material, security mechanisms) from the international community. 
Such endorsement and sponsorship could involve resolutions of the UN 
Security Council, definition of the role of the OSCE, and specific 
sponsorship by the major powers: Russia, EU, US. The texts could 
specifically include also references to the other neighbouring states, Turkey 
and Iran, of course endorsed by them.  
 
It would be a matter for negotiation how far the sponsoring parties would go 
in the extent of their commitment to action in the event that states of the 
region breached the agreements or treaties. While automatic collective 
defense mechanisms of the NATO article 5 type seems excluded, there are 
all possible graduations in language, including such well-known phases of 
the type: “ … if a party [seriously and persistently] breaches a provision of 
this agreement/treaty, the sponsoring parties shall take appropriate action.” In 
addition there would various mechanisms built into the agreements or 
treaties, for example for peace-keeping and regional security cooperation, 
which would increase the credibility and solidity of the peace. It may be 
useful to have in mind the kind of multi-power sponsorship of some earlier 
treaties establishing the neutrality of certain states or regions (see Inset D). 
 
Organisation of peace-keeping. At the time of entry into force of political 
agreements over such cases as Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, where there 
will be difficult matters of troop withdrawals, of inter-community relations 
and refugee return, international peace-keeping forces will surely be needed. 
With present operations in the Balkans there is now a serious shortage of 
well trained and equipped forces available, especially when constraints of 
political balance are added.  
 
Peace-keeping operations come in all graduations, from a few symbolic 
observers to massive enforcement as in Bosnia and Kosovo. The South 
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Caucasus conflicts now to be resolved would seem to be placed high, but not 
at the highest extreme on this spectrum. It is to be hoped, perhaps expected, 
that when the political deals are struck, they will be respected in a relatively 
disciplined way by the parties involved. In other words, it should not be a 
state of anarchic ethnic violence of the kind observed in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
 
Participation in peace-keeping could be the subject of an ad hoc coalition of 
participants, especially since there would be a preference for avoiding that 
the operation be mandated as a whole to either the CIS or NATO. The EU 
and its member states could in principle take a more leading role politically, 
but its Rapid Reaction Force is not ready yet, and the member states are 
heavily committed in the Balkans. An ad hoc coalition of forces under OSCE 
auspices would seem therefore the most plausible formula. Such states as 
Poland and Ukraine both have substantial armies and soldiers with relevant 
language competence (but the Ukrainian forces in the Balkans are evidently 
lacking in material resources). A Polish Ambassador currently heads the 
OSCE monitoring mission in Nagorno Karabakh.  
 
Regional security cooperation.  As mentioned above, the South Caucasus 
Community (SCC) could make an early start over cooperation between both 
civilian and military forces. The SCC would thus be following a quite 
different ordering of its development compared to the EEC, which long 
remained exclusively economic. Here it is possible that the Partnership for 
Peace activities could be most useful, since the three countries are already 
working alongside each other in this NATO framework, which also includes 
Russia. Such activities presently concern reform and modernisation of the 
armed forces in relation to internal political structures. 
 
Security for the increasingly important oil and gas pipeline systems in the 
Caucasus is an obvious task for cooperation, and this is apparently already 
being prepared within the framework of the GUUAM group (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova). 
 
Guaranteed transnational corridors. The agreement or treaties would surely 
cover explicitly the needs for secure land transport specifically between 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and between Nakhichevan and the rest of 
Azerbaijan. It is understood that land swaps have been discussed for these 
cases. However other solutions, for a region intending to cooperate and 
embrace modern European norms, would seem preferable to operations 
requiring the displacement of substantial populations. Specific transport 
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routes could be given international legal status, or subject to international 
guarantees, supported as long as necessary by a peace-keeping presence. In 
due course such notions will evaporate, as borders become open and 
integration advances. 
 
Guarding frontiers against infiltration. OSCE observers are already posted on 
the Chechnya-Georgian frontier. Given the extreme importance of stopping 
criminal and terrorist infiltrations all along the Russian-South Caucasus 
frontiers in a politically sound and credible manner, OSCE would support a 
thorough border control system as substantially as necessary. 
 
Arms limitation and demilitarisation. OSCE would preside over negotiations 
to arrive at mutually agreed arms reductions in the South Caucasus, possibly 
to include also demilitarisation of selected territories. Already the CFE 
Treaty, as adapted at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 2000 and now 
awaiting ratification, provides a key set of quantified and verifiable limits 
(see Annex E). In particular quantified limits apply for the main conventional 
weapons for each of the three South Caucasus states and Russia (as well for 
other OSCE states).  
 
The quantified limits have both “territorial” and “national” ceilings, any 
difference referring in effect to the weapons of foreign states. However these 
limits are the same for the four countries mentioned. In other words, if a state 
wishes to use fully its ceiling for national weapons there would be no room 
for foreign weapons on its territory, subject to agreement over temporary 
arrangements.  
 
For Russia there is special provision for quantified limits in so-called 
“flanking regions”, which include both the Northern Caucasus and some 
Southern Russian oblasts as well as Northern regions such as Leningrad and 
Pskov. This means a significant link between Northern and Southern 
“Dimensions”, because the limits apply only to the total for both flanks. 
Thus, if Russia wished to redeploy weapons from North to South flanks, for 
example to handle the Chechnya problem, this could be done in principle 
within compliance of the CFE Treaty. Recently the Russian authorities, since 
renewal of the Presidency, have confirmed their intention to bring weapon 
deployments into compliance with the Istanbul agreed limits, whereas at the 
present time they are in excess. 
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In general terms the CFE Treaty provides a well-developed structure for 
negotiation, binding agreement and mutual monitoring of compliance, 
including coverage of the  specificities of the North and South Caucasus 
situation. It provides an invaluable basis for confidence building and 
considering further positive developments. For example there is also the 
important question for the South Caucasus of controlling and reducing stocks 
of small weapons such as rifles, which presents an obvious agenda for future 
attention.  
 
Redeployment of Russian troops and bases. Moreover, at the OSCE Istanbul 
summit in November 1999, Russia and Georgia also adopted a joint 
statement on implementation CFE Treaty for Russian force reductions on 
Georgian territory, with details on the timing and modalities of its 
withdrawal from the bases of Gudauta and Vaziani, and conditions of its use 
of bases at Bakull and Akhalkalaki. The agreement also refers to the 
readiness of OSCE countries to support financially these reductions and 
withdrawals. In the framework of a comprehensive OSCE security system 
for the region, the process of dismantling unwanted foreign military bases 
would be completed, possibly accompanied by financial measures.(see 
Annex F).  




5. A wider Southern Dimension 
 
5.1  Russia/EU/US Southern Dimension cooperation 
 
The stability of Europe in the 21st century will depend greatly on the 
relationship between the enlarging EU and Russia. In the North (Baltic-
Barents) area there is already a functioning system for good neighbourly 
relations and deepening cooperation under the “Northern Dimension” policy, 
even over highly sensitive matters like Kaliningrad.  
 
The overall objectives could be the same for a “Southern Dimension” policy, 
but with specific mechanisms for the Black Sea-Caucasus region. Apart from 
obvious differences between these Northern and Southern regions, there is a 
difference in the natural roles of the EU and US. In the Northern parts, and 
the Baltic and Barents Seas, the EU and Russia are already direct neighbours 
or close enough for real proximity effects (environmental etc.). In the 
Southern parts this is not so, whereas the US has been so far been a more 
weighty diplomatic actor. On the other hand the EU, Russia and US have 
begun to experiment with some trilateral high-level diplomatic encounters. It 
is therefore a question whether cooperation over the Caucasus region might 
become an important domain for more developed trilateral cooperation.  
 
Bilateral or trilateral, there could be a fresh initiative, of possible interest to 
the new Presidency of Russia. From a European standpoint the commonality 
with the Northern Dimension is a very simple but basic idea: the enlarging 
EU and Russia will be coming closer and closer together territorially over the 
next years and decades. The common border in the North is going to 
lengthen. In the South, the EU’s Black Sea enlargement means that the EU 
and Russia will become virtual neighbours there also on a large scale. If the 
South Caucasus states pursue seriously their “European vocations”, the 
virtual EU-Russian frontier extends again.  
 
In the North there is a quality of trust and cooperation. In the South it should 
become the same. In that way Russia’s perception of the EU will be that of 
its large neighbour, which seeks solid cooperative relations wherever they 
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meet. Russia’s strategy towards the EU contains no more superficial 
fantasies about EU accession, such as President Yeltsin and Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin used to speak of  (see text from now President Putin to the EU 
Helsinki Summit Council in December 1999). This becomes therefore a 
more healthy relationship politically.  
 
The content of the Southern Dimension policy would have obvious 
differences but still some similarities compared to the Northern Dimension. 
It would have bilateral and regional components, then wider aspects 
involving all Black Sea as well as Caucasus countries (analogue with Baltic 
and Barents Sea cooperation), and important oil/gas-related economic 
developments (analogue with the Barents Sea and Yamal projects in the 
North).    
 
It would be even better if it proved politically feasible for the US to join the 
Russian Federation and the European Union in a trilateral “Southern 
Dimension” cooperation. This would of course facilitate access to greater 
resources, and linkage with the diplomatic effort to establish a durable 
security system for the Southern Caucasus. It could become a matter for the 
two new presidencies of Russia and the US to consider, as an important test 
case for their future relationship. Such a programme would also enhance 
transatlantic cooperation and solidarity, identifying an additional area of EU-
US cooperation.  
 
EU-Russian bilateral cooperation. However the EU should explore the scope 
for a “Southern Dimension” policy with Russia bilaterally in any case, within 
the framework of their existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and 
recently exchanged strategy documents. A dialogue would be opened on the 
possible extent of cooperation in both the Northern Caucasus and its 
neighbouring South Russian regions (Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol).  
 
In general in the Northern Caucasus, and not just in Chechnya, Russia has 
the extremely difficult task of working out a strategy for assuring basic law 
and order and then economic and social recovery. Neither the EU nor OSCE 
nor Council of Europe have an official view on how to revise or reform the 
workings of Russian federalism specifically in such regions as the Northern 
Caucasus. However the EU may be able to take a lead in helping in 
pragmatic ways. 
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The most urgent needs are for emergency supplies resulting from the 
Chechnya conflict (medicines, shelter, food), especially in Chechnya, 
Ingushetia and Dagestan.  
 
Most of the North Caucasus entities are heavily aid dependent, in some cases 
up to 80 % of their total expenditures (civil service costs, social security and 
pension funds, even basic supplies) have to be covered from the federal 
budget.  The prevailing precarious economic and social conditions have 
caused permanent aid-addiction and the emergence of subsistence 
economies, which are often dangerously linked to organised crime and 
extensive corruption. It is therefore a matter of priority for the Russian 
Federation to work out – and the EU could help with technical assistance 
and, as the case may be, financial support - a realistic short and medium term 
strategy to make those entities economically viable, by encouraging 
legitimate local entrepreneurship in a properly regulated market 
environment. 
 
Subsequent actions could aim at the long-term recovery and development of 
the region. Concretely the EU could propose a preliminary agenda of 
cooperative actions, for example including the following six point 
programme: 
-  1/ “Georgian military highway”: the only highway crossing the middle 
of the Caucasus, from Northern Ossetia down to Tbilisi. This route is 
strategic for any economic recovery of the Northern Caucasus. It needs 
upgrading and also modernisation and equipment of the 
frontier/customs/security facilities. The World Bank and EBRD could 
finance it later, but first a feasibility study is needed in cooperation with the 
Georgian side. Ossetian business interests already proposed this. 
-  2/ Pan-European Corridors/Networks: for integration with South Russian 
transport networks and links to TRACECA and INOGATE projects. This 
would add coastal Caspian and Black Sea north-south connections to the 
existing east-west routes of the Southern Caucasus. Availability of European 
Investment Bank funding could be considered, if the political climate became 
promising.  
-  3/ Alpine tourism: the Western Caucasus has outstanding tourist 
potential. Today it is underdeveloped and poorly equipped by modern 
standards, and most business has been driven away by security risks. But 
with peace and order in the region there could be a new take-off. Mt. Elbrus 
is equivalent of Mt. Blanc of the Alps (actually somewhat higher). The 
regional authorities of Alpine regions should be invited to join with Caucasus 
partners to advise on a comprehensive new development plan, with special 
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reference to the skills of organising cross-frontier cooperation (e.g. France-
Italy, or Austria-Italy models from the Alps; or France-Spain from the 
Pyrennees. Twinning arrangements could be most helpful to open the eyes of 
Caucasus regional leaders to their natural opportunities.  
-  4/ Combating crime: the EU understands the priority need to re-establish 
law and order throughout the region, especially to stop the horrendous 
kidnapping business that prevails throughout the region, not just Chechnya, 
and also the trans-Caucasus money laundering and drug/arms trafficking 
which is operating on a large scale. The EU for its part develops its Justice 
and Home Affairs competences. The scope for cooperation may be limited in 
the early stages but should be examined as a longer term proposition. 
International trafficking of drugs, weapons and money laundering are 
common concerns. 
-  5/ Joint EU-Turkish-Russia business development programme, given the 
demonstrated aptitude of Turkish entrepreneurs to establish business 
ventures in parts of the North Caucasus (e.g. in Kabardino-Balkaria), and 
also the new status of Turkey as an accepted candidate for EU accession. 
-  6/ EU-Russian sponsorship and EU financial support for a special 
Council of Europe programme for civil society and human rights in the 
North Caucasus (e.g. helping NGO structures develop, supporting the 
Convention for Human Rights, and facilitating recourse to the European 
Court of Human Rights, which now has jurisdiction in Russia).  
 
Chechnya. The above are examples of conceivable cooperation under 
relatively normal North Caucasus conditions. Of course the case of 
Chechnya is different. Here the immediate priorities are to find a way of 
achieving peace, and then to work out a political regime for the region that 
has a chance for a return to normality.   
 
Early in the post-Soviet period a Tatarstan type constitution for Chechnya 
might have been viable. But the two wars make this much more difficult. 
Direct rule from Moscow seems the only formula for the time being. Russian 
constitutional formulae are basically of three categories: 1/ direct rule, 2/ 
ordinary oblast status (region of the federation) and 3/ autonomous republic 
status, which however includes a wide range of variants, with Tatarstan the 
closest to independence. The conventional approach now in prospect might  
be to rely on direct rule for a period sufficient for law and order to be re-
established, then to revert to autonomous republic status.  
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However the conventional approach may or may not work. There may come 
a time when more imaginative proposals including more substantial 
international contribution to solving the Chechnya problem is sought by 
Russia, for example if there seems to be in prospect an indefinite 
prolongation of guerrilla warfare and continued deterioration of relations 
between the Caucasus diaspora in Russia as a whole and the Russian ethnic 
population throughout the Russian federation.  
 
A constructive and open-minded analysis of the options for conflict 
resolution has been recently offered by Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie 
Moscow Center
3. Trenin’s argument has important messages for both Russia 
and the European Union. “The ways to solve the Chechen problem range 
from an agreement of association between Chechnya and the Russian 
Federation to formal independence. …. Perhaps at some point it will be 
decided that instead of a semi-independent subject it would be more 
beneficial to have a semi-dependent neighbour. … The advantages of 
separate existence can reveal themselves only under a stable regime in 
Chechnya. Just as Israel finally agreed with the principle of an independent 
Palestine – provided that the PLO authorities refuse to practice terrorism and 
offer real guarantees of security to Israel – Russia might well want to 
exchange a piece of its territory for real guarantees of its security.  
 
If such an approach were to be endorsed, Trenin adds that .. “at some point, 
and certainly at Moscow’s invitation, observation of the implementation of 
commitments assumed by both parties could be maintained by international 
organisations, such as the OSCE. Of course, this requires an evolution of 
thinking on both sides, especially among the Chechens.” (The OSCE role in 
Chechnya at present consists of an Assistance Group with offices in Grozny 
and Moscow, with a very limited mandate).  
 
“Europe’s problem is how to harmonise its moral indignation and its long-
term interests. Russia at present may be neither a threat .. nor an opportunity 
.. for the countries of the European Union, but it is certainly not a country 
which can be safely ignored. At some point, when the European Union is 
confident enough about its Common Foreign and Security Policy, a Caucasus 
stability pact will need to be implemented – in close cooperation with the 
countries of the region and obviously with Russia. Together with the 
                                                           
3 “Land for Peace – A policy Option for Chechnya? On the Realties of War and 
Prospects for Peace”, Bulletin of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic 
Security, February 2000. 
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Balkans, the Caucasus is a challenge to Europe’s international identity. The 
way it deals with it will define its future role and heavily impact on its 
relations with Russia”.  
 
“The West, above all the European Union, must go beyond criticising 
Moscow for the conduct of the war in Chechnya and engage Russia in a 
constructive dialogue about ways of post-conflict rehabilitation of the region, 
including the creation of economic incentives for a lasting peace.” 
 
In the meantime the international community will of course react to evidence 
of abuse of the “rules of war”, as well as breaches of the European 
Convention for Human Rights. This now has full jurisdiction in Russia, 
including the possibility of cases to be brought to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg, which now also has a Russian judge. Proper 
investigation and judicial procedures have to be the norm. In fact an 
independent human rights commission was established by President Putin in 
the spring of 2000, but it is too early to assess its work.  
 
At present open dialogue between Russia and representative Chechnyans 
hardly exists. It may be that some dialogue could be usefully initiated 
through the good offices of non-government organisations. 
 
Bilateral US-Russian cooperation. If it were decided to proceed with 
“Southern Dimension” cooperation on a trilateral basis, there would 
doubtless be a rich agenda of topics and projects coming from the US side, 
with some of the same topics as those just listed (but we make no attempt 
here to sketch this). For their part the EU and US have acquired considerable 
experience of working together with Russian partners in the last decade, 
especially in Moscow. 
 
 
5.2 Enhancing Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation. 
 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established in 1992 and 
upgraded in 1998 into a full-fledged regional organisation. Its members 
include all Black Sea littoral states, but also all three South Caucasus states, 
as well as Greece and Albania. It has a full political structure, with a Summit 
level, a Council of foreign ministers, a Troika presidency mechanism, a 
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Committee of senior officials, a comprehensive set of sectoral Working 
Groups, a parliamentary assembly, a development bank, a policy research 
institute etc. This ambitious structure is young, BSEC has yet to become 
really effective, and it suffers from weak EU involvement. However its 
membership and structure are most promising. The focus could be on 
building up BSEC (and not duplicating it with a new initiative).  
 
Ways of progressing might include, first, that the EU should enhance its 
involvement in the organisation, and put its political and financial resources 
behind it. The EU would rationalise its different mechanisms for financial 
intervention in the region, which are different for PHARE, TACIS countries 
and Turkey (however these seemingly bureaucratic questions belie political 
issues). Concretely BSEC should be well placed to facilitate the advance of 
major transport networks (including the eastern extension and connections of 
Pan-European Corridors), trans-border energy (including pipelines and high 
voltage transmission lines) and communication (optic fibre and wireless) 
infrastructure, and regional environmental programmes. 
 
Presently there exists no adequate forum for multilateral consultations on the 
complex issues of regional coordination of oil and gas development issues. 
While negotiations of specific investments and contracts will of course be the 
preserve of the directly interested party, there could be value in a regular 
Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Energy Forum, under the auspices of BSEC. 
With rapid and major developments in both oil and gas sectors, the idea 
would be for a forum to keep constantly under review the evolution of 
common interest questions, such as management of the common 
environmental concern over Black Sea energy transportation. Another 
possible task would be to prepare for a  regional application of the 
forthcoming “transit protocol” of the Energy Charter Treaty. This would be 
concerned with the conditions of access, ratification and dispute settlement in 
relation to multinational pipeline networks, and would build on the work 
already initiated by the EU-financed INOGATE project. 
 
President Shevardnardze has recently proposed that BSEC give balanced 
attention to economic, political and security issues (see Annex G). If this 
were agreed the organisation might be renamed “Black Sea-Caucasus 
Cooperation” (BSC). To serve broader political needs there should be a 
wider Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Political Forum (BSCC), meeting under 
the auspices of the BSC, which the remaining Caspian states (Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Iran, possibly also Uzbekistan) would be invited to join as 
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well as the US (somewhat analogous to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council in relation to NATO).   
 
 
5.3 Oil and gas development 
 
The whole package of political, security and economic measures proposed 
would transform the business climate for the region as a whole, enormously 
reducing perceived political risk for major long term investors, notably in the 
oil and gas sector.  
 
The hydrocarbon sector would be set to achieve its full economic potential. 
There has in recent years been a re-assessment of the earlier exaggerated 
claims for the size of the Caspian’s economically viable hydrocarbon 
potential (see Annex C). Industry experts now assess the Caspian basin to be 
roughly of North Sea proportions, and certainly not the Persian Gulf. 
Moreover the cost of extraction and delivery to European markets is 
comparatively high but currently competitive with the North Sea.  
 
For oil, by 2020 conventional predictions place total Caspian (North and 
South) production at between 3 to 5.5 million b/d (Annex C). Pipeline 
projects capable of transporting 4.5 to 5.5 million b/d are already identified. 
These figures also tie in with projected market demands within the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea and within the Caspian region itself. If demand 
is lower, or production increases more slowly than predicted, then export 
capacity would adapt to the lower pace. The increased pipeline capacity 
would be built, and additional horsepower (i.e. increased operating pressure) 
would be added as capacity demand increased. Pipeline systems are highly 
flexible once the initial investment has been made. 
 
For gas, the key driver will be the Turkish gas demand.  Turkey today 
consumes some 20 bcm/y.  This is projected to rise sharply by 2007 to 50 
bcm/y.  Demand is then planned to increase on a steady incremental basis, to 
85 bcm/y by 2020 (Annex D). Two thirds of the expansion depends on the 
continuous development of the gas-fired energy sector.  These growth 
projections are based on a series of inherently risky assumptions, and may 
well be on the overoptimistic side, at least as regards the speed with which 
such large demands build up. Nonetheless these developments will in any 
case be of strategic interest to the European gas supply situation, since they 
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will be the basis for major new investments, and the Turkish gas network 
connects with that of South-east Europe. Moreover the EU is going to need 
fresh gas supplies, given the decline of North Sea production and rising 
demand for gas favoured by environmental concerns. In this respect the 
plethora of suppliers from the region is attractive for competitive reasons, 
especially since these can converge in some options on shared pipeline 
infrastructures.   
 
These factors imply that with a more secure investment climate and 
commercially effective transport routes, the energy sector, with its multiplier 
effect on the rest of the economy, could make an enormous contribution to 
the region’s economic welfare. It would still not be a matter of global   
importance for the geo-politics of world energy markets. Nevertheless South 
Caspian oil, with its natural markets firmly positioned in the Black Sea and 
Mediterranean area, would be of  strategic importance for the long-term 
energy requirements of Southern and South-Eastern Europe. 
 
The policy interests shaping the framework conditions for oil and gas 
investments in the Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea region are naturally those of 
the suppliers and the buyers: on the one hand the producers and exporters, 
which happen to be all the littoral Caspian states (Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran), and on the other hand the importers and 
consumers, which in terms or proximity are first of all Georgia, Armenia and 
Turkey, but then also the enlarging European Union, in particular South-
central and South-east Europe. In addition, both the EU and US are 
represented by the major international oil companies' production and 
marketing interests. Supply and demand have natural divergencies of 
interest, but in the final analysis they have to meet.  
 
Suppliers of energy are naturally interested in achieving dominant market 
positions, either through monopoly or oligopolistic cartels such as OPEC, if 
they have a chance to do so. Russia is the only supplier that may contemplate 
aiming at a monopolistic positions on a large scale, but for the enormous 
European market this is impossible for either oil or gas, given the alternatives 
sources. If such ambitions are seen to be unrealistic, then the objective must 
be to secure full access to international supply networks, under safe and fair 
conditions, and to achieve long-term supply relationships that will make 
major investments feasible. 
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Consumers of energy on the other hand, especially very large ones such as 
the European Union, have several natural interests: 
- competitive conditions among a sufficient number of suppliers to get 
favourable terms of trade. To develop more ample supply capacities in the 
Caspian region would be useful, but not the main point in a world market 
where the OPEC cartel can have a major influence prices at least 
episodically,  
- favourable business climate conditions in the supplying areas, so as to 
attract ample long-term investment to ensure supply capacities, including the 
whole range of legal security, taxation and governance issues (including the 
legal security of Caspian under-sea property rights, which is not yet settled), 
- economic security of supply for such vital products as oil and gas, which is 
best served by multiple sourcing, and can be supported by international legal 
agreements concerning pipeline transit (the Energy Charter Treaty can help 
here),  
- environmental security, for example to avoid oil pollution of the Black Sea 
through limiting traffic by large oil tankers through the Bosphorus, 
- geo-political security, which means that sound long-term relationships with 
important neighbours, based on agreed rules and mutual advantage, need to 
be built up. The Russia-EU relationship is the most important one for Europe 
as a whole, and in fact the Brezhnev-Schmidt gas supply and pipeline 
agreement of the 1960s, leading to the trunk gas pipelines from Western 
Siberia to Germany, became a major geo-political-economic stabiliser for 
Europe. However the same clarity of strategic cooperation does not yet exist 
around the Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea region. 
 
Pipelines. The oil industry favors multiple options for commercially driven 
export pipelines, built in a timely manner in response to confirmed capacity 
demand. Consumer interests, whether Turkey or the EU, look for diversified 
sourcing, for both economic and geo-political security as argued above. In 
practice these objectives can be met to a high degree. Notably, there will 
surely be expansion of Northern pipeline routes through Russia, trans-
Caucasus routes from Caspian to Black Sea, some Turkey–Iran connections 
as well as increased tanker transport of oil across the Black Sea.  
 
The major new projects awaiting definitive decisions and full-scale 
implementation are the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the trans-Black Sea gas 
pipeline (‘Blue Stream’) directly from Russia to Turkey and the trans-
Caspian gas pipeline from Turkemenistan to Baku. The economics of these 
projects are in fact interrelated. Moreover a new factor is the discovery of a 
 37A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT OF THE CEPS TASK FORCE ON THE CAUCUSES 
large new gas field in offshore Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz), increasing maybe 
decisively the case for a major new trans-Caucasus gas pipeline, whether 
connected to a trans-Caspian pipeline or not.  
 
If this new gas pipeline were placed alongside the proposed Baku-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, at least part of the way into Turkey, it would reduce the costs of the 
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which until now have appeared to be very high. 
Baku-Ceyhan has the advantage of completely avoiding the Bosphoros 
bottleneck, and the Turkish authorities might in any case resort to 
increasingly costly ways of securing environmental protection of the 
Bosphoros, such as double-hulled tankers and tighter regulations. 
 
The Blue Stream and trans-Caspian pipelines are in direct competition and 
both could not succeed. However the Turkmen gas can be routed via Russia 
overland, with expansion of exiting connections. Russian gas can also be 
routed to Turkey overland, as already round the Western coast of the Black 
Sea, and possibly through augmented supplies via the Georgian gas network 
to the East, which itself could connect with a new trans-Caucasus gas 
pipeline from Baku.    
 
Legal security. Four steps could improve the investment climate: 
-Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Russia has signed 
but not yet ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, which is important for the 
legal security and non-discriminatory treatment of investment and pipeline 
contracts. A formal ratification by the Duma would signal Russia’s 
commitment to the principles of the treaty – namely non-obstruction of 
transit, non-discrimination, respect for property and contracts and a 
favourable investment regime. Russia’s ratification of the ECT would serve 
as a valuable step towards its closer economic integration with the EU. The 
EU should engage Russia at high-level in a political and commercial 
dialogue to encourage Duma ratification.  
 
-Transit Protocol Agreement. Negotiations are proceeding on the inclusion of 
an additional transit protocol agreement to the ECT. Serious obstacles 
include the unfavourable positions of several key Russian players: the main 
pipeline network corporation Transneft is reported to favour the Transit 
Protocol, but Gazprom to have reservations over this extension of the 
international legal framework. The EU should support these negotiations and 
engage in dialogue with Russia on the mutual benefits of the agreement.  
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-EU-Russia economic collaboration in the Caucasus beyond oil & gas. The 
South Caucasian states currently lack experience and expertise in the 
management of inter-state economic relations. Hence, the tendency to revert 
to atavistic attitudes based on self-assertion, which block the gains that flow 
from an institutional framework promoting trade, investment and financial 
collaboration. Such collaboration could be promoted by a regional trade & 
investment agreement - based on the ECT, but without the ECT's limitation 
to energy. The agreement could be proposed by the EU and elaborated with 
EU technical assistance. 
 
-Attribution of Caspian seabed and offshore territorial rights. The clear 
attribution of Caspian sea-bed and offshore territorial rights is not yet 
assured. The current legal insecurity in the Caspian discourages risk averse 
companies and increases the political and financial risk of all operations in 
disputed areas - including exploration and laying of pipelines. On the other 
hand a proven model for handling such issues is the drawing of median lines 
as in the North Sea. For the Caspian this seems increasingly the most 
plausible outcome. Russia and Kazakhstan have made a preliminary median-
line agreement, which awaits ratification. However it would be politically 
and economically prudent if short to medium term alternative options were 
developed, such as joint development zones, prior to a long term global 
solution for the subdivision of the Caspian being agreed. Joint petroleum 
development agreements have proved a useful transitory method to provide 
the legal security required for oil and gas investment prior to a permanent 
border delineation.  
 
The EU could prepare a study incorporating the current claims and 
negotiations and suggesting a draft agreement prepared by technical and 
neutral experts. Such a study could include proposals for national subsoil 
areas, based on equi-distance and current agreements, together with a joint 
petroleum development zone for the most intensely disputed areas are 
recommended. The Thailand-Malaysia, Korea-Japan and UK-Norway joint 
petroleum agreements provide useful precedents. A draft agreement should 
also deal with regulatory issues and could propose joint, rather than separate 
regulation on fisheries, navigation, pipeline-laying and environmental 
regulation. Once a draft agreement is available the EU could initiate a 
process of conciliation between the different parties. The Caucasus states 
would thus become increasingly accustomed to peaceful and non-
confrontational methods of settling seemingly intractable disputes. 
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Local economic benefits. The oil and gas development is most likely to 
produce, as it did in other regions, a significant across-the-board expansion 
of the local consumers goods and services markets, manufacturing industries, 
farming and food production, construction, banking and financial services, 
tourism and leisure, etc. Increased government revenues would also permit 
higher outlays for education, culture, health and social services. The resulting 
feed-back would provide additional incentives for enhanced regional 





The Caucasus is a remote area for the EU and the US. Big grant money 
cannot be assured. The region does not have the proximity to Western 
Europe of the Balkans, nor the priority of EU accession candidates. The 
countries of the region would have therefore to make a huge effort in terms 
of their own political will for large-scale resources to be made available. 
However a credible cooperative strategy by all countries of the region, in 
agreement with the external powers, could switch on resources from private 
sector, as well as from international financial organisations. To have chance 
of gaining major grant support from the EU and US it would have to be clear 
that a real “new deal” was being secured: i.e. a lasting transformation of the 
political, security and economic context of the region as a whole, something 
that the Western political leaders could justify to their parliaments as a 
decisive investment. This is why leaders of the region have every reason to 
aim at comprehensive and radical action, not just an incremental step-by-step 
approach. 
 
Up until 1999 the EU supplied 826 million euro of grant assistance to the 
three South Caucasus states. There are signs that the recent level of 
assistance will not be sustained unless political settlements of the conflicts, 
since the conflicts make it impossible to get good returns from such 
resources.  For the EU to make an important, expanded contribution of grant 
finance it would be necessary for the European Council to request a revision 
of the medium-term financial perspectives of the EU Budget. Similarly, it 
would require a top-level political decision for EU finance ministers to give a 
mandate to the European Investment Bank to undertake operations in the 
region. 
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For the US, there would have to be a request to Congress for authority to 
extend significant new financial commitments for the Caucasus.     
 
The IBRD and EBRD could certainly amplify their lending and investment 
programmes in the context of a New Deal for the Caucasus (estimates should 
now be prepared by their staff economists).  
 
The Council of Europe Development Bank has begun to undertake projects 
in South-East Europe for reconstructing housing, health-care and educational 
facilities for returning refugees communities, and could extend such 
activities into the North and South Caucasus
4. 
 
The oil and gas sector will be largely self-financing, and just need a 
politically secure business environment to proceed with maximum 
commercially justified investments. The Azerbaijan government’s borrowing 
capacity will be increased if oil sector prospects improve. 
 
The Armenian Diaspora shows considerable capacity and will to invest in the 
region, and this would surely be greatly amplified as trade blockades are 
lifted and the region would get set on a sound path of regional integration. 
 
Similarly, the potential for expanded Turkish direct investment in the region 
is considerable. 
 
In the absence of hard data on reconstruction costs for the war-hit parts of the 
Caucasus, certain data from the Balkans are of interest as some kind of 
yardstick. 
1.  For Bosnia the World Bank compiled in 1996 a five-year priority 
reconstruction programme, which donors endorsed. The total cost was $5.1 
                                                           
4 Examples of operations in Bosnia and  Croatia are in circumstances quite 
similar to war-hit areas of the  Northern and Southern Caucasus. The Bank’s 
total financing operations amount to over 2 billion euro per year, with only 
relatively small amounts so far for refugee return projects. However the member 
states of the Council of Europe could request that these operations in both the 
Balkans and Caucasus be given higher priority. 
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billion, for a state with 4.5 million population, at least half of whom had been 
displaced, and 250 000 killed (see Annex J).  
2.  For Kosovo the World Bank and EU Commission estimated in 1999 that 
the external financing requirement for a four-year period was $2.3 billion. 
This is for a region whose population was about 2 million, of whom most 
were displaced (see Annex I).  
  
Taken together, these assessments are beginning to suggest an empirical 
regularity of $ 1 billion urgent and basic reconstruction needs per 1 million 
of population, for regions hit by Balkan-type (and Caucasus-type ?) wars. 
For comparison, Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighbouring Azeri territories 
presently occupied by Armenian forces had a population of about 800,000 
before the war. Abkhazia had a pre-war population of about 540,000. If there 
was the same scale of damage as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the same 
standards of need assessment, one would arrive at figures approaching $1 
billion for Nagorno-Karabakh and about $0.5 billion for Abkhazia. Such 
benchmarks may be compared in due course with the findings of future 
World Bank missions to the Caucasus, hopefully sent in view of the 
imminent peace. In the meantime they may be retained as the most likely 
figures, pending replacement by directly collected data.   
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Annex A: Background on the economies of the Caucasus 
 
  Population, million  GDP p.c., $  GDP, $ million 
Armenia 3.7  510  1,887 
Azerbaijan 7.6  540  4,107 
Georgia 5.4  967  5,221 
Southern Caucasus  16.7  671  11,215 
Northern Caucasus  11.6     
 
 
Armenia. Since independence Armenia’s economy has undergone serious 
disruptions partly as a result of liberalisation and partly as a consequence of 
the Karabakh war and the 1998 earthquake. In the early 1990s Armenia 
underwent virtual industrial collapse with a drop of GDP of approximately 
60% in 1991-93. Inflation spiraled into hyperinflation by 1994 and 
unemployment and poverty became widespread. The government’s reform 
programme was slowed due the country’s political and natural problems, 
which dramatically reduced trade, increased transport costs and multiplied 
investment risks.  
 
Since the end of the war with Azerbaijan in 1994, the Government has 
implemented a stabilisation and structural reform programme, backed by 
several international donors besides the Armenian Diaspora
5. Total 
IBRD/IDA commitments to Armenia as of July 1999 have been of $607m 
for over 20 operations covering infrastructure rehabilitation, earthquake 
reconstruction, irrigation, agricultural development, health and education. 
Since 1994 the economy has been growing at an annual average of 6%
6, 
inflation has fallen to an annual rate of approximately 9% and the budget 
deficit has fallen to approximately 3% GDP
7. Growth has been triggered 
primarily by increased capacity utilisation facilitated by increased trade with 
FSU and Middle-East economies.  
 
                                                           
5 Transfers from the Armenian Diaspora may amount to approximately half a 
billion dollars per year.  
6 European Commission, Economic Trends, Armenia, Oct-Dec 1998. 
7 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, Armenia’s economy remains seriously flawed. Investment is 
notoriously poor. The EBRD calculated that for 1997, total investment 
amounted to 8.8% GDP and FDI reached a mere $52m, i.e. amongst the 
lowest levels throughout the FSU. Armenia’s external trade performance is 
also weak with stagnating export levels and rising imports which have 
caused a rising current account deficit which reached 25.2% GDP in 1998. 
Poor trade performance is clearly linked to the Azeri and Turkish embargoes. 
Armenia is landlocked and far from European, North American and East 
Asian markets. Hence, the importance of its immediate neighbourhood. 
However, the Azeri and Turkish embargoes prevent Armenia’s direct trade 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey. They also harm trade with Georgia and Iran. 
Georgia has exploited the embargoes by further increasing transport costs on 
Armenian goods
8. Macro-economic trends in 1999 suffered further as a 
consequence of the 1998 Russian crisis, which caused a renewed industrial 
decline, a further deterioration of external balances and accelerating 
inflation.  
 
Azerbaijan. Transition from the Soviet system and the war with Armenia 
over Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the loss of approximately 15% of 
Azeri territory and to nearly one million Azeri refugees, caused significant 
economic disruptions. By 1994 GDP stood at 37% of its 1988 levels. 
Agricultural and industrial output fell by 43% and 60% respectively in 1988-
94 and particularly harshly hit were the oil and gas sectors where production 
declined by 4.2m metric tons. 
 
Since 1995, with a gradually stabilising political climate, the government 
began implementing the IBRD/IMF reform programme with considerable 
results. Inflation declined from 1,664% in 1994 to 1% in 1997 and has been 
negative since then, and budget deficits fell to 2% GDP in 1998 as a result of 
tight fiscal and monetary policies. However tight macro policies did not 
prevent annual GDP growth from reaching a 10% peak in 1998. External 
balances have also improved. The $1.5billion (33% GDP) current account 
deficit of 1998 was successfully financed through FDI flows principally 
related to the expanding oil sector, which amounted to approximately 
$1billion. Azerbaijan has also received substantial financial support by IFIs. 
Between 1992 and 1999 for example, international aid reached $369million 
in projects principally providing technical assistance to strengthen the 
government’s institutional capacity to manage and develop its oil industry.  
                                                           
8 Costs of transporting containers from Poti to Yerevan are around $2,000, i.e. 
approximately the same amount for transportation from New York to Seattle, 
which is almost ten times the distance.  
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The country has thus made considerable economic progress in the latter half 
of the 1990s. However, the sustainability of its success and the full 
exploitation of its economic potential continue to hinge crucially upon 
political stability and most importantly the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Political factors as well as external economic 
developments are particularly important in the light of Azerbaijan’s lack of 
industrial diversification and exclusive concentration on the oil sector. The 
country’s potential economic vulnerability was clearly evidenced during the 
1997/98 collapse in oil prices and the 1998 Russian rouble crisis. That   
accentuated the current account deficit and caused a 7% depreciation of the 
manat against the dollar, which imported inflation in 1999. 
 
Georgia. The economic disruption of Georgia caused by transition to a free 
market system was compounded by the civil conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and potential instability in Adjaria and Javakheti. As a result 
Georgia underwent serious economic decline with output falling by over 
70% between 1990 and 1995, capacity utilisation declining to 20% of its 
1980s levels. Annual inflation reached 8,400% in 1993 and internal and 
external imbalances were accumulating at an alarming pace.  
 
With the cessation of heavy fighting and cease-fire agreements in 1992 for 
South Ossetia and 1994 for Abkhazia, the government was able to embark 
upon constructive structural reform and sound macro-economic management. 
The government was also considerably aided by IFI assistance. By 1999 
$510m has been committed by the IBRD in projects aimed at promoting 
private sector development, improving infrastructure, developing 
institutional capacity and strengthening social security. The EU has also been 
active in the country particularly via TRACECA projects focusing on the 
upgrading of Black Sea ports.  
 
By 1996/1997 GDP growth reached 10%, and inflation fell to 1% in early 
1998. As other countries of the FSU, Georgia suffered in 1998/1999 from the 
Russian financial crisis. Growth declined to 1.7% in the first half of 1999, 
inflation rose to 11% and the positive trends in internal and external accounts 
were reversed. Nonetheless the government has persisted in its policy of 
fiscal and structural reforms. The government in Tbilisi has aimed to increase 
tax revenues through an expansion of the tax base and improved tax 
administration, while directing public expenditure to priority policy areas 
such as health and education. The government has also aimed to diversify the 
country’s production base by focusing on privatisation, infrastructure 
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development and the creation of a sound regulatory framework. Progress 
however remains slow partly due to the volatile political situation and lack of 
a formalised constitutional settlement of the conflicts. 
 
The North Caucasus
9. The North Caucasus comprises seven republics, 
including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia and Adygeya. The total population of the 
republics is 11.5 million
10. 
 
The economies of the North Caucasus have been characterised by two 
interrelated phenomena. First, they have been relying upon financial transfers 
from Moscow. In the light of the region’s depressed tourist sector and poorly 
developed industrial sectors, the republics are net recipients of budgetary 
transfers. The most heavily subsidised republic is the ethnically fragmented 
Dagestan, the poorest republic of the North Caucasus
11 with over 80% of its 
revenues coming from the centre. Transfers are primarily intended to provide 
minimum social protection including income support and free provision of 
electricity and gas. Few resources have been available for investment and 
development programmes.  
 
Second, responding to necessity, the republics have effectively resorted to a 
variety of “survival strategies”. In Ingushetia, President Aushev effectively 
bargained with Moscow the Republic’s status of Free Economic Zone, 
allowing the Republic to earn income as if an off-shore area. North Ossetia 
has capitalised on its strategic position linking the Russian Federation to 
Georgia via two access routes, on its huge Russian military presence and on 
its role as link to transport tax-free alcohol from Europe to Russia. Chechnya 
has relied upon more explicit criminal activities including kidnappings and 
racketeering, in the light of the climate of political violence in this war-
devastated region. Kabardino-Balkaria has been relatively successful in 
developing its manufacturing industry and has benefited especially from 
Turkish investments since the mid-1990s. Finally, both Karachai-Cherkessia 
and Adygeya have focused on the development of agriculture through small 
and medium-sized farms. In all of the above cases, politics continue to play a 
                                                           
9 For a more detailed account of North Caucasian economic trends, see Liono, A. 
"Economic Survival Strategies in the North Caucasus", CEPS Conference paper, 
January 2000. 
10 Nicholson, M. "Towards a Russia of the Regions", IISS Adelphi Paper 330, 
1999.  
11 Per capita gross regional product of  $1,250 in 1998, UNDP, Human 
Development Report 1998. 
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crucial role in the legal and semi-legal distribution of resources organised by 
local political elites. 
 
Table 1: Population of the Northern Caucasus
12
 
Adygeia    541  000   
Chechnya      862 200 (early 1990s estimate, current 
numbers unknown) 
Dagestan              2 150 000 
Ingushetia      303 500 (early 1990s estimate, large 
refugee inflows since)  
Karachaevo Cherkassia    436 000  
Kabardino-Balkaria    790 000  
Northern Ossetia   663 000 
 
Total, 7 entities, approx.          5 500 000  
                                                           
12 Note: these figures come from a variety of sources and should only be 
regarded as approximate, and in any case take no account or recent 
displacements as a result of conflicts. 
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Annex B: Background on areas of conflict and tension 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh. An autonomous region of the Azerbaijan SSR between 
1923 and 1991/2, NK had a pre-war population of 200,000. The conflict over 
NK emerged in the late 1980s, as a result of the loss of legitimacy of the 
Soviet hierarchical framework which included Union republics (such as 
Azerbaijan), Autonomous republics (such as Abkhazia) and Autonomous 
regions (such as Nagorno-Karabakh). Autonomous regions were both 
dependent from Moscow and from their Union republic. Armenians in 
general and from NK in particular heavily questioned the legitimacy of the 
Azeri rule over the NKAO. At the time of the outbreak of the war the 
Armenian ethnic share of NK's population was 75%.  
  
In the final years of the Soviet Union, unrest grew. Demonstrations soon 
acquired a distinctive ethno-political nature and tensions escalated, 
culminating in the first formal demand in 1988 by the Armenians in NK to 
transfer the region from Azeri to Armenian rule. Moscow rejected the 
demand and the Armenian SSR responded in 1989 by calling for the 
reunification of the Armenian SSR to NK. Following a brief interlude of 
direct rule from Moscow, NK voted in favour of full independence in 
January 1992. In reaction to this unilateral declaration, Azerbaijan abrogated 
the autonomous status of the oblast. These final events triggered a full-scale 
war between the Azeri army and well-organised forces of NK, which were 
directly supported by Armenia. By 1992-3 Nagorno-Karabakh had not only 
gained control of the NKAO territory but also of seven additional districts in 
Azerbaijan, which together represent around 10% of the Azerbaijan's total 
territory. The occupied districts include Lachin and Kel'badzhar, allowing the 
direct connection between NK and Armenia. Since the cease fire agreed in 
1994 NK has functioned as a non-recognised state and NK Armenian troops 
remain stationed in all of the occupied districts.  
 
The war led to extensive refugee flows and extreme economic distress. 
Ethnic riots took place in some of the cities of Azerbaijan where a significant 
Armenian population lived. Approximately 200,000 Armenians fled 
Azerbaijan to Armenia and NK, while 45,000 emigrated to Russia. On the 
other hand, 185,000 Azeris and 11,000 Kurds fled from Armenia and 47,000 
Azeris left NK. Between 500,000 and 600,000 Azeris migrated from the 
occupied districts to Azerbaijan making a total of around 800,000 Azeri 
refugees and displaced persons (10% of the country's population).  
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Since the cease-fire of 1994 the situation in and around NK has been 
characterised by military stand-off (with just a few relatively minor flare-
ups) and political stand-still. The OSCE-appointed Minsk Group (Russian 
Federation, United States, France) have produced several proposals for a 
possible comprehensive settlement, but none has proved acceptable to the 
parties to the conflict so far. 
 
Abkhazia. An Autonomous Republic in the framework of the Georgian 
Union republic, in the hierarchical Soviet framework, Abkhazia was both 
dependent on the Moscow party leadership and the Tbilisi authorities. These 
relations were complicated by the fact that the Abkhaz community was 
holding a large number of leading posts in the republic of Abkhazia, but 
constituted only a minority of 18 per cent of its population. These privileges 
had been granted according to the Soviet view of the right to peoples to self-
determination, which included the possibility for so-called "titular nations" to 
control administratively a certain part of the Soviet territory. The privileged 
position of the Abkhaz community in Abkhazia was challenged by the far 
larger Georgian community, which constituted in 1989 about 45 per cent of 
the population. From the Georgian perspective, the cultural and political 
hegemony of the Georgian nation over the Georgian Union republic had to 
be extended to its autonomous units.  
  
In the last decade, the Abkhazian national movement had made repeated 
attempts to withdraw from Georgia and to be included in the Russian 
Federation. Since 1989, the conflict between the ethnic communities in 
Abkhazia escalated, leading to the intervention of Georgian troops in August 
1992. In response, the Abkhaz, led by V. Ardzinba launched an offensive, 
supported by the so-called Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus. 
They also received support from Russian military stationed in Abkhazia. The 
Georgian troops were defeated and the Georgian population of Abkhazia 
fled. 
 
In 1993 the UN deployed an observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG). A 
cease-fire was agreed upon, with the introduction of a Russian (formally 
CIS) peacekeeping force monitored by UNOMIG. Much of the peace-
keeping activity takes place in the Gali region, whose pre-war demographic 
composition had been 90% Georgian. Peace negotiations have been carried 
out under the auspices of the UN. Through Russian mediation, Shevardnadze 
and Ardzinba signed in 1997 an agreement on the non-use of force. 
Nonetheless, Georgian refugees, resentful of the lack of perspectives to 
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return, have formed paramilitary groups, particularly in the Gali region. The 
situation in the security zone remains highly volatile.  
  
In the negotiations, the Abkhaz authorities have been proposing a confederal 
framework, where Georgia and Akbhazia would be both equal in rights as 
sovereign entities. They would delegate a number of competences to the 
government of a Common State. The Georgian authorities are, to the 
contrary, convinced that Abkhazia has to be seen as a part of Georgia. They 
are ready to federalise Georgia in order to accommodate the Abkhaz claims. 
None of these proposals was providing sufficient security guarantees to the 
other side. In 1999, Abkhazia declared its independence, based on a 
referendum where only a part of the pre-war population was able to 
participate. 
 
War damage from the Abkhaz war has not been tackled by serious 
reconstruction due to the Georgian and Russian blockades on the region. 
Food and other basic needs are scarce, factories operate at an extremely low 
capacity and the provision of gas an electricity is sporadic. The conflict has 
clearly also seriously damaged Georgia by cutting off the best transport 
routes to Russia and discouraging the rebirth of tourism throughout the 
country. 
 
South Ossetia. There are approximately 600,000 Ossetes living in the 
Caucasus. Prior to the war a majority of 440,000 Ossetes lived in the 
Autonomous republic of North Ossetia in the Russian Northern Caucasus, 
while the rest were concentrated in Georgia, with around 65,000 in the 
Autonomous region of South Ossetia and the remaining 95,000 in the rest of 
Georgia. The conflict in South Ossetia emerged in the late 1980s when the 
South Ossetes began publicly to claim greater autonomy. In 1989 South 
Ossetia had requested its upgrading to the status of an Autonomous republic. 
Georgian nationalist movements mobilised to "defend the Georgian 
population" by force. They regarded the Ossetes as relative latecomers in the 
region, which had no right to a specific political status in Georgia. Both 
parties tried to use force to impose their views. South Ossetia was virtually 
depopulated of its ethnic Georgian population and approximately 100,000 
Ossetes living in Georgia fled either to North or South Ossetia, while many 
South Ossetes joined their northern neighbours. In 1992 a South Ossetian 
referendum voted in favour of unification with North Ossetia within the 
Russian Federation, under dubious legal and political conditions. A number 
of leading Russian leaders supported South Ossetia openly. Russia was in 
1992 at the brink of war with Georgia because of South Ossetia. In June 
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1992, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze met in Dagomys, and a cease-fire was 
signed between the warring parties. A Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace-
keeping force was established under a joint control commission. An OSCE 
Mission in Georgia promoting settlement negotiations was later incorporated 
in peacekeeping efforts. By late 1997, confidence building measures 
reopened communication links between Georgia and South Ossetia and 
thereafter the conflicting parties agreed to a memorandum establishing the 
non-use of force and a commitment to refugee repatriation and 
demilitarisation. However, there has remained disagreement over the 
ultimate political status of South Ossetia.  
 
Adjaria. This coastal region in south west Georgia bordering Turkey, Adjaria 
has a population of just over 400,000, of whom a vast majority (392,000 in 
1989) are Muslim and some are bilingual in Georgian and Türki, a variant of 
the Turkish language. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and Georgian 
independence there have been tensions, but not violent conflict, over 
economic issues and struggles for political power between the region's 
president Abashidze and Shevardnadze's party. While Abashidze aims to 
strengthen the region's economic potential and encourages the presence of 
the Russian military bases in Batumi, Tbilisi has weakened the Adjarian 
economy by excluding Batumi from its major transport projects. 
 
Meskhet-Javakheti. An in-land region of south west Georgia bordering 
Armenia, over 90% of a population of approximately 235,000 are ethnic 
Armenian. During the period of perestroika, the Armenians in Javakheti 
under the national popular movement 'Javakh' called for the preservation of 
their Armenian cultural heritage and protested against Tbilisi's neglect of 
their economic situation. The movement radicalised in subsequent years, 
calling for the autonomy of Javakheti or its incorporation in Armenia. 
Tensions escalated again in 1994 when Javakheti and Meskheti were merged 
in a single administrative unit, and an ethnic Georgian was appointed as State 
Representative of the region. There are 6 administrative districts that are 
ruled by independent consuls, who are directly linked to the central 
authorities in Tbilisi. There is no common administrative body for the region. 
Conflict in Javakheti has not erupted as in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia 
has a strong interest in caution (risks of another war, complete blockade). 
Russia has a military base in Alkahalki.  
 
The Lezghins. According to a 1989 census, the Lezghins represent an ethnic 
group of 400,000, who like the Ossetes straddle a border area with Russia, in 
this case along the Samur River dividing the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
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Republic of Dagestan. Approximately 252,000 Lezghins live in southern 
Dagestan, while the rest in the north east of Azerbaijan. The Lezghins have 
protested against their division following the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the independence of Azerbaijan. They also perceived themselves to be 
discriminated against by Baku. The political organisation 'Sadval' was 
formed standing for Lezghin rights and for the possible formation of an 
independent Lezghin state. In 1993 Lezghin demonstrations erupted into 
violent clashes with the Azeri police. Baku however, keen not to involve 
itself in another war, has sought to cooperate with Dagestan officials on 
issues of Lezghin concern. An agreement between Dagestani, Russian and 
Azeri officials has been signed in Baku agreeing on a 'transparent' border 
between the two states. 
 
Nakhichevan. An autonomous republic within the state of Azerbaijan 
bordering Armenia, Turkey and Iran, Nakhichevan has a population of 
310,000 of whom the vast majority is ethnic Azeri.  Political tensions in 
Nakhichevan in the late 1980s and early 1990s was more the result of an 
attempted assertion of independent political power, rather than a product of 
ethnic politics, given that by 1989, virtually all of the Armenian population 
of Nakhichevan had left the Azeri enclave. Following Azerbaijan's 
independence in 1991 the region remained an autonomous republic within 
Azerbaijan with its own constitution, government, parliament and judiciary. 
The authorities there had competence for policy areas such as local taxation, 
tourism, economic development, social security, environmental affairs, 
health and culture. During Elchibey's presidency of Azerbaijan, 
Nakhichevan, led by Heydar Aliyev, attempted to establish a greater degree 
of independence, before he took power in Baku itself. In this respect it is 
notable that Azerbaijan's last two presidents, Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar 
Aliyev both originate from the region.  
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Annex C:  South Caspian oil -  realities and issues 
 
Resource Potential. There has been continued speculation in the media on the 
size of South Caspian oil reserves.  Since its inception in 1875, Baku's oil 
development has enjoyed a varied history.  At the turn of the 20th Century, 
Baku was the leading oil producer in the world.  During subsequent Soviet 
rule it became the economic mainstay of Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution, and 
later the critical energy supplier for the Russian Eastern Front in World War 
II.  In 1949, Baku was the World's first truly offshore oil producer.  However 
by the late 1970s, Moscow had redirected oil investment priorities to West 
Siberia, with long-term plans to return to the Caspian in the opening decades 
of the 21st Century.  Oil production in Baku peaked at around 250 000 b/d in 
the mid-1980s, but  then declined to some 140 000 b/d. By 1990 the oil 
industry of the South Caspian was already in a state of dilapidation and 
decline. With the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the process 
rapidly accelerated.  
 
During the Soviet Period, Caspian oil investment was closed to the West.  
But with the formation of the newly independent states in 1991, direct access 
by western investors into prime Caspian exploration and development 
acreage was encouraged.   The attraction for the Oil Majors lay in the 
untested potential for new giant oil fields in the deeper waters of the South 
Caspian.  There were already many clearly defined large untested structural 
traps, lying on trend with existing oil discoveries.   Soviet technology 
constraints, coupled with delayed Soviet capital investment in the Caspian oil 
sector, had thus created a unique opportunity for low risk oil exploration by 
the West.   A proven recoverable oil reserve of 17.5 billion barrels had 
already been  discovered in the South Caspian (Azerbaijan and West 
Turkmenistan); and an extensive database was used for technical due 
diligence, to underpin a revised geological projection for the discovery of a 
further 20 billion barrels. Moreover South Caspian oil quality is particularly 
attractive (30 API with no contaminants), and these new reserves can all be 
accessed by conventional technology.  
 
Already since the return of foreign oil investment in 1994 into South Caspian 
oil development,  Azerbaijan production has risen to 240 000 to 260 000 b/d, 
and West Turkmenistan 120 000 to 130 000 b/d. But this is just a beginning. 
In the absence of significant impediments to investment, by 2010 South 
Caspian oil production should reach some 1.2 to 1.5 million b/d. This makes  
South Caspian oil resource comparable to a new North Sea equivalent; but 
not the new Kuwait that has been frequently promoted in the media.   
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But offshore exploration and development in the South Caspian is expensive. 
Failure costs are high (in excess of $200 million per contract 
area). Conversely in the event of success giant (multi-billion barrel) oil fields 
will be found, and finding costs are low.  These currently translate into about 
$0.5 to $0.75/bl., which in global terms is commercially very attractive.  It 
also puts South Caspian oil potential to the forefront of opportunities for 
international exploration. But clearly this is a game for the Oil Majors, which 
have the financial means and breadth of global risk portfolios to tolerate the 
possible costs of failure.   The full cost  of producing Caspian crude is 
currently about $12.50/bl.  By coincidence this is the cost equivalent of a 
North Sea barrel.  But two cost elements dominate the Caspian barrel; 
transportation ($6.50/bl.) and drilling ($3.0/bl.).  Both are likely to fall within 
the foreseeable future.  Therefore if the world price of oil were sustained at 
levels above $13 to $15/bl. (currently it is $27/bl.), Caspian oil investment is 
highly profitable, and certainly globally competitive. 
 
Since 1994 the South Caspian has attracted a substantial number of foreign 
oil investors.   By applying a politically and commercially expedient oil 
policy, Azerbaijan created an environment conducive for investor 
confidence. Its low risk petroleum geology had already been 
confirmed.  Commercial confidence was successfully achieved through the 
award of sophisticated Production Sharing Contracts (PSAs), which enjoy 
particular benefits and security under Azerbaijan parliamentary law.  Some 
19 such contracts have been signed to date, involving 27 foreign upstream 
investors.   One (the so-called "Contract of the Century") is for the 
development of an existing giant oil field, with firm commitments for an 
ongoing investment of some $10 billion.  Eighteen Contracts were signed for 
renewed exploration, with short-term  (3 to 5 years) expenditure 
commitments of some $4 billion.  If a third of these exploration contracts are 
successful and convert to Development PSAs, then a further $30 billion 
investment is involved. 
 
These major oil investments are clearly providing a fundamental driving 
force for economic renewal, whilst at the same time creating a series of 
remarkable set of international geopolitical alliances within the region and 
with the West.   These oil contracts have become the central  plank of 
Azerbaijan foreign policy.   But the impressive processes of change 
achieved by 1998 have now slowed almost to a stop.  Major offshore oil 
investments have been suspended, pending resolution of new regional 
export  systems in a process that regrettably has become politicised. The 
symbiosis of economic growth and political stability in the Caucasus has 
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been demonstrated by events to date. But all  must be underpinned by 
continuous investment from the private sector, to reinforce the realities of 
sustainable development long term. Also this investment activity must not be 
confined to the energy sector alone, but must be expanded into the power, 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors as well.  The diversity of options for 
future economic growth within the Caucasus are truly legion, if positive 
regional political will is present.   
 
Legal uncertainties over Caspian status. Legal uncertainties over national 
ownership of the waters of the Caspian Sea remain unresolved.  This not 
only creates major conflicts of national interest between the littoral states; 
but also inhibits regional development of material offshore natural resources, 
and delays investment in much needed industrial infrastructure.  In particular 
uncertainty over offshore title presents serious challenges for conventional 
project financing in the private sector.   World Bank, IFC and EBRD 
financing, with political risk cover, is proscribed where national title is in 
dispute, and where the common agreement of all member states involved is 
required. 
 
The land-locked Caspian, although connected to the Black and Baltic Seas by 
a series of canals, a priori does not meet the criteria set for a "closed" or 
"semi-closed" sea, as set by the Convention of the United Nations on the 
Law of the Sea  (1982).   Furthermore the newly emergent states of the 
Caspian have not yet themselves ratified this 1982 Convention.  The issue of 
whether or not the Caspian is a Sea or a Lake  remains ambiguous.   The 
challenge at the heart of the debate is whether or not the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction over the Caspian sea-bed will be based on the principle of 
"Common Ownership" or "Separate Ownership". 
  
Until 1991 the Caspian had two littoral states, Iran and the USSR.  With the 
collapse of the USSR, Caspian jurisdiction is now claimed by five border 
states: the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
Iran.   Existing Caspian Treaties (1921, 1928, 1940) which established an 
agreed regime between Iran and the USSR, are now subject to renewed legal 
challenge.  Although these treaties addressed the issues of a common border 
and rights of navigation, they made no reference to the exploitation of natural 
resources beneath the sea-bed and the legalities involved. 
 
By 1994 the Russian Federation had concluded that they alone retained the 
rights and obligations under existing treaties,  and warned the newly 
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independent states against unilateral action.  However the latter soon 
recognised perhaps with some reluctance, the need for dialog and mutual 
cooperation, if long-term stability and sustainable economic development of 
Caspian resources was to be achieved. 
 
In 1995 the littoral states agreed to establish a permanent mechanism for 
negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian, in the form of Joint Working 
Groups.   These were to be led by the respective legal Directors of their 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs.  The first meeting took place in Tehran (June 
1995), followed by Almaty (September 1995); at which time the participants 
(excluding Russia) confirmed their commitment to the United Nations 
Charter as it applied to the Caspian. This was done with particular reference 
to the principles of territorial integrity, demilitarisation, protection of the 
environment, and free navigation for the littoral states. 
 
In March 1996, Azerbaijan signed a formal Intergovernmental Agreement 
with Russia, in which the latter provided guarantees for the safe transit of 
Azerbaijan oil through its sovereign territory, which de facto recognised 
Azerbaijan's right to produce and develop the sub-surface resources of its 
offshore oil fields.  In particular it confirmed the titular rights of the new 
Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), to produce oil from the 
Chirag Oil Field.  A year earlier NIOC (State Oil Company of Iran) had 
applied for membership of the AIOC consortium, which de facto also 
provided recognition of Azerbaijan's rights to develop its Caspian oil 
resource. 
 
However, by 1997 there was a renewed polarisation of views between the 
littoral states on the status of the Caspian. Both Iran and Russia advocated 
that division of the Caspian should be on the basis of a Condominium of 
equal interests, but with the creation of a 12 mile coastal zone under national 
jurisdiction. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan proposed an opposing solution 
based on a sectorial split of the Caspian using existing norms of international 
practice.  This position obtained the progressive support also of Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan, which embarked on negotiations for a determination of a 
common median line over a disputed area in which already proven 
undeveloped oil fields were located. 
 
In July 1998 Russia and Kazakhstan unexpectedly signed a bilateral Caspian 
Delimitation Agreement, over the sea -bed of the North Caspian. This was 
done for the specific purpose of exercising their sovereign rights to develop 
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their own offshore mineral resources.   For the first time a new Caspian 
successor state to the USSR established its exclusive right to develop and 
manage its own subsurface resource; whilst clearly separating the issue of 
sea-bed delimitation from the issue of the legal status of the Caspian. 
Consequently the Agreement recognised that freedom of navigation (and 
aviation), placement of underwater pipelines and cables and all other uses of 
the Caspian Sea, would be regulated by future bilateral/unilateral agreements 
between the littoral states, within a broader convention that would only then 
address the legal status of the Caspian as a whole. 
 
Iran and Turkmenistan immediately protested over this independent bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan, emphasising "the irreversible 
principle of unanimity by the five littoral states on all decisions regarding the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea", to ensure equal shares of Caspian resources 
by all five states.   However, this mutual support between Iran and 
Turkmenistan was short lived. By February 1999 Turkmenistan was already 
committed to the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to Baku. This 
culminated in November 1999 in the signature of a framework Agreement 
between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, for a gas pipeline 
that would bypass both Iran and Russia. This is subject to continuing protest 
by Russia, on grounds of disputed legal status and ecological risk in  the 
Caspian sector.   Equally Iran itself was taking independent action.   In 
December 1998 it signed an Exploration Study Contract with Lasmo  and 
Shell to assess the hydrocarbon potential of the Iran sector of the Caspian 
Sea.   This agreement included certain rights for the award of subsequent 
contract areas to the participants, on already agreed terms. However in May 
1999 Iran formally claimed territorial rights over a substantially extended 
sector in the South Caspian, that impinged on areas that both Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan claimed as their territorial waters.   In addition it included 
contract areas already awarded to foreign investors by the Azerbaijan.  At the 
same time Iran continued to  claim an equal share of all Caspian mineral 
resources under the proposed Condominium for the Caspian to provide them 
with 20% of the regional economic benefits from existing and future 
development.   Clearly Iran has most to gain and least to lose from 
procrastination over Caspian title. A settlement through the International 
Court could be obtained, although the track record for reaching such 
international resolutions extend to decades. 
  
Conclusion. The legal status of the Caspian remains unresolved; and presents 
serious political potential for ongoing conflicts of interest between all littoral 
states.  Currently there is clearly a lack of general political will by the parties 
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to face the challenge of regional cooperation, essential for long term 
economic development of their offshore resources.   
 
Although Western investment in the Caspian has seen the beginnings of one 
major offshore oil development in Azerbaijan (AIOC), this proceeded on the 
basis of own financing by the participants, without recourse to external 
project financing from the private sector.  However for new development 
projects in the future, conventional financing will be required.  Projects will 
need undisputed title or full regional concurrence. For such a high business 
risk area as the Caspian, private sector financiers will look to the World Bank 
and its subsidiaries for leadership. 
 
Therefore  it is a matter of priority that the littoral Caspian states are 
encouraged to re-engage in positive negotiations on Caspian status, to 
achieve not only a legal framework for the benefit of  sovereign states 
themselves, but for continuity for long-term investment as well. Progressive 
legal solutions  based on common and binding agreements must be 
considered, leading to a final resolution of full Caspian status only in the 
longer term.  In the meantime the participants should be encouraged to revert 
to proposals submitted by Azerbaijan (1997), based on the Convention of 
Montego Bay (1982); which allows for the postponement of negotiations on 
specific median line resolutions.   This would enable the parties to focus 
on  the creation of exclusive areas with national undisputed development 
rights, following the divisions already described in Soviet oil regulations 
(1970).  This would then create the ability to negotiate Joint Development 
Zones within Disputed Areas. 
 
External funding and independent expert counsel on these highly specialised 
legal aspects of international maritime law and petroleum development 
practice, should be made available to Caspian sovereign states, to facilitate a 
balanced regional outcome. 
 
Lastly under all ongoing scenarios for the final resolution of Caspian status, 
the parties must recognise requirements imposed by the findings of the 
International Court of Justice on the International law of the Environment 
whereby: "It is the general obligation of the States to ensure that activities 
executed within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other states or of areas beyond national control, is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment [and] this need is aptly 
expressed in the concept of sustainable development to reconcile economic 
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development with the protection of the environment"  [ICJ 1996, 1997].  The 
creation of a common ecological baseline for the Caspian is clearly a matter 
of regional priority, to be addressed with some urgency.  
 
Caspian pipeline strategies. The risk of not being able to transport Caspian 
Oil to market was, and still is, perceived to be the most significant business 
challenge for oil investment in the region.  The extended delays experienced 
by Chevron in the evacuation of oil from Kazakhstan through Russia to the 
Black Sea, is a prime example.  The creation of an effective regional pipeline 
by the Caspian Pipeline Company from Tengiz to Novorossisk, was pending 
since 1992. It is now under construction, and should become operational in 
2001.  The new CPC line to Novorossisk when fully commissioned will have 
an eventual export capacity of 1.3 million b/d.  This should then capture the 
bulk of North Caspian oil exports, and serve Russian long-term commercial 
and political interests in a material way.  The primary challenge that remains 
for the North Caspian is future shipment of substantial Russian and Kazakh 
oil volumes from the Black Sea, through the congested Bosphorous Straits. 
 
In the South Caspian AIOC, the first foreign oil consortium, made export 
capacity to the Black Sea the strategic priority for its investors, before any 
offshore investments were made. Dual export routes were targeted, for 
operational expediency and commercial security.   Consequently in early 
1996 pipeline transportation agreements and inter-governmental treaties were 
signed by Azerbaijan, firstly with Russia, and subsequently with Georgia.  
These allowed for the transportation of some 120 000 b/d of Azerbaijan oil 
through the existing Russian infrastructure northwards to Novorossisk, and 
westwards through Georgia to Supsa.  Azerbaijan oil was first transported to 
international markets through Russia in late 1997. 
 
For the last three years some  East Caspian crude has been successfully 
transported across the Caspian and transshipped through the Caucasus by rail 
from Baku to Batumi.  Likewise Turkmen oil has been successfully 
transferred to the Tehran Refinery via the Iranian Neka Pipeline, for onward 
equivalent oil swaps in the Gulf.   Additional export capacity for South 
Caspian crude is also available through the Volga Don Canal system (for 
summer operations); and by rail from Makhachkala to Novorossisk.   
Currently there is sufficient export capacity available to third parties, for all 
South Caspian exportable oil to be shipped to international markets. 
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For the longer term, there are emerging plans for major regional export 
pipelines, which are the subject of heated political debate.  These are to the 
North (Baku-Novorossisk via a Chechen by-pass) with a capacity of up to 
0.5 million b/d; to the West (Baku Supsa-Baku Ceyhan) with an initial 
capacity of 1 million b/d; and to the Tehran refinery in the South with a 
capacity of 350 000 b/d.   It is no longer a matter of if, but when these 
pipelines will be built. Once new oil is found and capacity is needed, the 
market will respond, and new pipelines will follow. But without new oil, 
pipeline investments will be delayed 
 
For existing Caspian export pipeline systems, market competition to capture 
export crude has already resulted in reducing transportation costs. In 1998, 
the Iranian swap option gave the best inclusive tariff ($4.9/bl.).  In 1999 in 
response to market competition, rail transportation costs were materially 
reduced from Dubendi to Batumi and tariffs fell (from $8.3/bl. to $6.50/bl.).  
Tariffs for Volga Don summer operations were also set at competitive levels 
($5.9/bl.).   But all existing tariffs are still set levels which could 
accommodate price reductions.   In summary, the current average 
transportation cost for exporting crude from the South Caspian to a 
Mediterranean refinery is around $6.00 - $6.50/bl., but will continue to 
reduce with time. 
 
Swaps of crude oil with Iran are still the cheapest Caspian transportation 
option. Also there is significant potential for Iran to reduce their swap fees 
further, and still maintain competitive advantage.  However the volume of 
such swaps is limited by Iran for strategic reasons, and the international 
tender for a new pipeline from Neka to Tehran confined pipeline design 
capacity to 350000b/d.  Such volumes of Caspian crude would then service 
approximately 50% of their own northern market needs, in the region where 
the bulk of the Iranian population lives.  But to become 100% fully market 
dependent on Caspian crude would be strategically imprudent. Likewise to 
take far greater volumes of Caspian crude by Iranian pipeline to the Gulf for 
onward marine transfer to E Asia or to US West Coast would be 
commercially impracticable.   This would introduce an extended 
transportation cost to reflect the increased distances involved. It could not 
compete commercially with the far cheaper oil transportation of Caspian 
crude to more proximal markets in the South Mediterranean and Black 
Sea. Equally Iran and other OPEC Gulf producers would not wish to see 
large volumes of Caspian crude enter their already congested sea-way.  But 
more importantly Iran would not wish to see their Asian markets undermined 
by competitive Caspian crude.  Thus Iran is unlikely to access more than 
10% of future Caspian production and arguments for a new main export 
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pipeline through Iran to the Gulf are commercially ill founded, making 
political opposition to this pipeline essentially irrelevant.   
 
Market studies have already confirmed that the Mediterranean and Black Sea 
countries should have the capacity to absorb up to 3 million barrels a day of 
Caspian crude.   Also as Caspian crude chemistry is environmentally 
attractive to both Mediterranean and Turkish refineries, it will displace 
supplies of less environmentally friendly crude from the Middle East and 
West Africa, on a cost-competitive basis. Therefore, the Caspian is 
essentially a niche producer positioned to service Southern Europe and the 
Black Sea only. 
 
But the confrontational politics arising from opposing arguments for South 
Caspian mega- pipelines, have become a negative factor in regional 
development.  The market demand for such Caspian oil export capacity is not 
yet in place.  Expansion of existing pipeline infrastructure can accommodate 
both short to medium term market needs.  Eventually, because of the Turkish 
Bosphorous marine bottleneck, a land pipeline to Ceyhan will be required. 
As for immediate priorities, there is a much needed $3 billion oil 
development in offshore Azerbaijan, which has already been suspended for 
two years.  The priority to unblock this impasse is self evident. The existing 
EU energy policy to support multiple pipeline options in the South Caspian, 
recognises the realities of commercial screening, and is politically well 
founded.  To extend this activity to a regional acceptance of the European 
Energy Charter Treaty, could only reinforce the positive aspects of future 
Caspian pipeline development. 
 
By 2020 conventional predictions place global Caspian oil production at 
between 3 to 5.5 million b/d. Pipeline projects capable of transporting 4.5 to 
5.5 million b/d are already identified. These figures also tie to projected 
market demands within the Mediterranean , the Black Sea and within the 
Caspian itself. If demand is lower, or production increases more slowly than 
predicted, then export capacity would adapt to the lower pace. The pipelines 
would be built, but additional horsepower (i.e. increased operating pressure) 
would be added as capacity demand increased. Pipeline systems are highly 
flexible once the initial investment has been made. 
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Annex D: Turkey, Europe and Caspian gas 
 
Unlike oil, gas (excluding liquified natural gas - LNG) is not such an easily 
transportable commodity.  Regional markets therefore dominate long-term 
gas development.  Likewise long-term (20 year) Sales and Purchase 
Agreements (SPA’s) are required before investments are made.  But there is 
a surfeit of gas resources in Russia, Central Asia and neighbouring countries 
in the Middle East (Table 1).  These proven gas reserves already exceed any 
conceivable demand projections for the coming century.  It is inevitable that 
their competitive development will continue to dominate the strategic gas 
debate in the capitals of South Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. 
The resource exists and the demand is present. Competition focuses on the 
selection of eventual transportation routes.     
 
Table 1:  Proven gas reserves, in TCM (trillion cubic meters) 
 
•  Russia    49 
•  Iran    23 
•  Turkmenistan     3 
•  Iraq      3 
•  Kazakhstan     2 
•  Uzbekistan     2 
•  Azerbaijan     1 
•  Egypt      1 
 
Total             84 
 
(Source: BP-Shell 1999) 
 
Although Southern Europe and the Balkan Black Sea markets represent the 
long term prize, in the short to medium term (2010) the Turkish gas market is 
set to be the primary target, with its rapidly expanding demand driven by 
gas-fired power generation. Turkey has already signed a number of loosely 
defined SPA’s (Table 2), with a remarkable range of potential gas suppliers.  
 62A STABILITY PACT FOR THE CAUCASUS 
The final “winners” are yet to be singled out.  Moreover, Turkey’s strategic 
gas planning is driven by conflicting needs: competitive pricing, 
diversification of supplies, and international and regional geo-political 
support.  
 
Two current gas projects are competing head on: first, Russia’s innovative 
“Blue Stream” gas pipeline across the Black Sea to Turkey; and, secondly, 
the Transcaspian Gas Pipeline Project (TCGP) to carry Turkmenistan gas to 
Turkey, across the Caspian and through the Transcaucasus Energy Corridor . 
The latter is a solution favoured by the United States.  Both projects are 
technically feasible.  But the volume of demand from Turkey in the short to 
medium-term can only justify one of these two projects, as currently 
conceived. The gas market is too small to justify the levels of likely 
commercial investment required for both.  In addition recent gas discoveries 
in offshore Azerbaijan have introduced further competitive complexity; 
either as a stand alone supplier to Turkey, or in combination with TCGP.  
Turkey is faced with a plethora of options, all of which carry some 
considerable risk and geopolitical consequence. 
 
 
Table 2: Turkish Supply Purchase Agreements - fact or fiction? 
 
 (billions of cubic meters per year - bcm/y) 
 
    Date   Volume   First 
delivery 
Russia (Western land route)  1986     6     n.s.* 
Nigeria  (LNG)    1995     1.2     n.s. 
Qatar  (LNG    1995     2     n.s. 
Iraq     1996   10     n.s. 
Egypt     1996   10     n.s 
Iran     1996   10 
 1992/2000 
Russia  (Blue  Stream)   1997   16 
 2000/2001 
Russia (Western land expansion)1998     8     n.s. 
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Algeria  (LNG)    1998     4     n.s. 
Turkmenistan    1999   16/30     n.s 
 
Total       93.2/120 
 
*n.s. = not specified 
 
The outcome will rely on the concrete realities of the Turkish gas demand.  
Turkey today consumes some 20 bcm/y.  This is projected to rise sharply by 
2007 to 50 bcm/y.  Demand is then planned to increase on a steady 
incremental basis, to 85 bcm/y by 2020.  Two thirds of the expansion 
depends on the continuous development of the gas-fired energy sector.  But 
these growth projections are predicated on a series of inherently risky 
assumptions, namely: 
•  that Turkish GDP will continue to grow at 7% p.a., 
•  that the power sector  will continue to expand at 9%p.a (i.e. the 
construction and timely completion of at least 7 major gas-fired power 
stations by 2010), 
•  that project financing of some $3 to 4 billion/year will be available 
throughout the investment period, 
•  that effective project management is available to ensure that both 
external and internal pipeline infrastructure will be built on time, to deliver 
contractual gas commitments, 
•  that the supply projects themselves will also be built in a timely 
and effective manner, 
•  and that all systems will then have an operational effectiveness in 
excess of 85%. 
 
These multiple risks and past track record would suggest that the official 
growth forecasts are optimistic. More modest and realistically paced 
developments will inevitably emerge.  Consequently not all the currently 
conceived SPA’s (Table 2) will achieve maturity within the period planned.  
So which are the likely short-term winners? 
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Current Russian gas supplies to Turkey use the pipeline infrastructure which 
transits through the littoral states of the Western Black Sea. The upgrading 
and expansion of this onshore infrastructure is well in hand.  But both Russia 
and Turkey recognise the inherent supply risk involved, with their total 
dependence on continuing third party transit rights.  This motivates the 
search for a more direct supply route for Russian gas to Turkey.   
Consequently, Russia has focused attention on a novel deep-sea gas pipeline 
across the Black Sea, the so-called “Blue Stream” project. This would take 
Russian gas direct to Turkey without an intervening transit. This Gazprom-
ENI project is designed to supply 16 bcm/y to Turkey by 2001.  However the 
project involves untested leading-edge technology, to lay some 375 km. of 
submarine gas pipeline in more than 2000 m. of anoxic waters.  Maintenance 
and long-term operability inevitably represents a considerable challenge. 
Joint venture financing is apparently progressing for some $2 billion of 
funding Italian, German and Japanese banks. It seems that onshore pipelay 
and gas storage is already under construction.  But the delivery deadline set 
for a first phase of 8 bcm/y under the existing SPA is most unlikely to be 
met. 
 
Moreover the project is under competitive threat from a trans-Caspian 
pipeline alternative.  The TCGP project, lead by a US-Dutch consortium, 
envisages a phased supply of 16 to 30 bcm/y of Turkmenistan gas to Turkey 
via the “Transcaucasian Energy Corridor”.  The pipeline uses conventional 
pipeline technology for both land and marine transits.  There is more than 
sufficient East Turkmen gas resources available to service the project (Table 
1); and Turkmenistan has had all necessary experience of shipping such 
volumes in the past. Some 85 bcm/y of Turkmen gas was shipped to Russia 
and Europe, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However the TGPC 
proposal is entirely dependent on the cooperation of Azerbaijan and Georgia.  
This was agreed in principle at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in November 
1999, when a Joint Protocol of Cooperation was signed between the various 
Presidents involved, and endorsed by the President of the United States. 
 
However, subsequent progress has been slow.  With the discovery of a mega 
gas and condensate field at Shah Deniz (1 TCM plus) in offshore Azerbaijan, 
an attractive alternative or contributing gas supply for TCGP, has been 
introduced into the supply debate.  Azerbaijan was itself in the 1980s a 
significant gas producer (14 bcm/y).  However gas production since then 
went into serious decline (it is currently 5 bcm/y), which were insufficient to 
service their internal gas market.  Consequently the new gas discovery at 
Shah Deniz has reversed this situation, and Azerbaijan sees an opportunity to 
capture the early gas market in Turkey itself.  The fact that the Turkish 
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Government is already an upstream investor at Shah Deniz gives competitive 
advantage. Since the project would involve a trans-Caucusus pipeline transit, 
this would also reinforce the alliances that are already driving the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline project.  Azerbaijan is therefore proposing an ‘Early Gas’ 
Project based on available gas reserves, to deliver up to 4 bcm/y to Turkey 
by 2003. They would rely on an upgrading of the existing pipeline 
infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Georgia.  A progressive phased development 
of Shah Deniz gas would follow, to deliver 20 bcm/y by 2010 and 30 bcm/y 
by 2015, using a new gas pipeline system yet to be built. However, no Azeri 
SPA has so far been signed with Turkey, perhaps because of attempts to link 
this commitment to conclusion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project.  
 
The Shah Deniz project could put also into question the need for a Turkmen 
trans-Caspian pipeline.  However the potential economies of scale from 
shared pipeline infrastructure could be substantial, and this is still a 
motivating force for cooperative dialogue between Ashgabad and Baku.  On 
the other hand the issue of offshore Caspian title and trans-national seabed 
transits remains unresolved, which, together with the continuing challenge 
from Russia and Iran against construction of any offshore gas lines on 
ecological grounds, point to inevitable delays.  At the same time political 
relations between Ashgabad and Baku are strained.  The Turkmen leadership 
is apparently unwilling to dilute its volume of projected gas exports to 
Turkey in favour of Azerbaijan, and Ashgabad is still looking for 
alternatives.  A potential contract for the export of  50 bcm/y to Russia is 
under review, involving a  60/40 barter/cash SPA to be negotiated.  The 
Turkmen party is holding out for a substantially higher gas price than 
currently on offer, as well as a reversal of the cash/barter split. This 
arrangement also carries underlying risk.  Turkey is unlikely to accept any 
Turkmen gas as a supply element through “Blue Stream”.  Also Gazprom’s 
previous track record involving major unpaid gas debts to Turkmenistan, 
should mitigate against any early agreement. Ashgabad is also looking south 
to Iran, as an alternative land route to Turkey. Iran has concluded a separate 
SPA with Turkey (Table 2) for the early export of 10 bcm/y.  Appropriate 
interconnecting gas infrastructure has already been built from Tabriz to the 
Turkish border. The connector on the Turkish side remains incomplete. Over 
the long term it is unlikely that Iran would wish to transit Turkmen gas, since 
this would undermine its own competitive advantage. 
 
As one can see, Iran’s future potential for increased gas export to Turkey and 
Europe is enormous (Table 1).  In the short-term however, transit of 
Turkmen gas could be possible, to bridge a potential supply shortfall, before 
Iran builds up its own gas supplies to Turkey.  Arrangements were in hand to 
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expand the existing West Turkmen gas line to North Iran from the present 2 
bcm/y to 7.25 bcm/y, with some of this gas for onward transmission to 
Turkey. But for major gas transit from East Turkmenistan, under the current 
US-Iran containment policy, considerable pressure will be exerted on both 
Ashgabad and its foreign investors not to compromise ILSA.  Facing such 
complexity, Ashgabad is likely to procrastinate. There is an increasing risk 
that Turkmen gas could well become an isolated asset in the future. 
 
Russia has also recognised that an ‘early gas’ scheme from Azerbaijan 
through Georgia, could seriously undermine their own long-term supply 
ambitions to Turkey, and then on into Europe.  Consequently Russia has 
already made a direct approach to Georgia for an ‘early gas’ initiative of 
their own.  Gazprom have proposed the creation of a joint venture with 
Saktourgas (Georgian natural gas company), to acquire common rights over 
existing Georgian infrastructure, in return for a guaranteed Russian gas 
supplies of 8 bcm/y.  This would then provide the joint venture with 2 bcm/y 
for internal use by Georgia, 2 bcm/y for supply to Armenia, and 4 bcm/y for 
early onward transmission to Turkey.  The project could be expanded at a 
later date to transmit a further 16 bcm/y to Turkey, through new pipeline 
infrastructure. This Russian-Georgian ‘early gas’ project would then pre-
empt the Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan initiatives, and allow perhaps for a 
delayed start for the “Blue Stream” initiative, which is already facing timing 
problems.  As yet Georgia has not accepted the Russian proposal, but 
remains vulnerable to threat of winter isolation from potential Russian gas 
supplies.  
 
Turkey is thus faced with several competing offers as between Russia, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia for its expanding energy market.  However the 
choice of must be made soon, if Turkey’s economic interests are not to be 
compromised.  Whoever wins the ‘early gas’ prize will be preferentially 
positioned by 2010-2015 for the larger prize, that of the gas markets of 
Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.  In all scenarios, Turkey will become 
the strategic gas supply conduit for this larger region. 
 
Is a regional solution possible where all parties could participate? There is 
surely scope for regional cooperation between Russia and the Caucasus, if 
Blue Stream were to be suspended. Thus a major gas line from Baku carrying 
Azeri gas could join with Russian supplies arriving over the Caucasus into 
the Georgian gas network, flowing on into Turkey. For Turkmen gas also to 
flow into this supply route would however require agreement over 
constructing the trans-Caspian underwater gas line, as well as agreement 
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over how to share pipe capacity from Baku onwards. These seem at the 
moment very demanding conditions. However Turkish and EU interests in 
diversity of gas supply could be substantially met by the above combination 
of Russian and Azeri gas arriving through Georgia, together with increased 
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Annex E: Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia, 
Istanbul, 17 November, 1999 
 
The Russian Federation and Georgia,  
 
guided by Paragraphs 14.2.3 and 14.2.7 of the Decision of the Joint 
Consultation Group of 30 March 1999 concerning adaptation of the CFE 
Treaty.                                                                             
 
confirming their intention to properly implement the adapted CFE Treaty as 
adopted,  
 
wishing to promote the strengthening and development of cooperative 
relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia,  
 
have agreed as follows:  
 
The Russian Side undertakes to reduce, by no later than 31 December 2000, 
the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia in such a way 
that they will not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems;  
 
No later than 31 December 2000, the Russian Side will withdraw (dispose 
of) the TLE located at the Russian military bases in Vaziani and Gudauta and 
at the repair facilities in Tbilisi.  
 
The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will be disbanded and 
withdrawn by 1 July 2001.  
 
The issue of the utilisation, including the joint utilisation, of the military 
facilities and infrastructure left in the dismantled Russian military bases in 
the above-mentioned locations;  
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-  The Georgian side undertakes to give the Russian side the right to install 
temporarily the main part of the armaments and machinery limited by the 
Agreement in the installations of the Russian military bases located in Batull 
and Akhalkalaki;  
 
-  The Georgian side shall assist in creating the necessary conditions for 
the reduction and withdrawal of the Russian forces. In the connections the 
sides note the readiness of the OSCE countries to support the process 
financially;  
 
-  During the year 2000, the sides shall finish negotiations on the rules and 
conditions of functioning of the Russian military bases in Batumi and 
Akhalkalaki, as well as other military installations on the territory of 
Georgia.  
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Annex F: Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and 
Equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) 
 
The States Parties hereby agree upon the following territorial ceilings and 
territorial sub-ceilings pursuant to Article V of the Treaty (data for states of 
Caucasus region only): 
 
State Party  Battle Tanks  Armoured combat 
vehicles 
Pieces of artillery 
Armenia (3,4)    220      220    285 
Azerbaijan (3,4)    220      220    285 
Georgia (3,4)    220      220    285 
Russia 




  2140 
6315 
1680 
Turkey (3,4)  2795    3120  3523 
 
(1) In the Leningrad Military District, excluding the Pskov oblast; and in the 
North Caucasus Military District, excluding: the Volgograd oblast; the 
Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending 
from 
Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including 
Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray 
leading to Kushchevskaya. This territorial sub-ceiling shall not be exceeded 
to  
Article VII for military exercises and temporary deployments in 
the category of armoured combat vehicles. 
(2) …  
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(3) States Parties which shall increase their territorial ceilings or territorial 
subceilings pursuant to Article V, paragraph 5, only in conjunction with a 
corresponding decrease, pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4, subparagraph 
(A),  
in the territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings of other States Parties,  
as identified by this footnote. 
(4) States Parties which shall not exceed their territorial ceilings or territorial 
subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 153 battle tanks, 
241 armoured combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery. 
(5) States Parties which shall not exceed their territorial ceilings or territorial 
subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 459 battle tanks, 
723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 pieces of artillery.” 
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Annex G: Remarks by Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia 
at the Informal Summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Istanbul,  
November 17, 1999 
 
Mr. Chairman, Dear friends,  
 
Let me extend my sincere thanks to President Demirel for bringing us 
together for this meeting. As the initiator of the Black Sea Economic Co-
operation, and one of our Organisation's largest and most active members, 
Turkey has proven once again to be a driving force behind deepening the 
cooperation among us.  
 
Given the dynamics of processes in our region, we can hardly afford to wait 
until an official summit is convened to determine the common ground of our 
positions. The developments in the North Caucasus are of our particular 
concern today. I believe we must make it our common goal not to allow an 
expansion of hostilities, since the economic projects in the region, both those 
underway and those planned for the future, could be seriously impeded. 
Virtually all countries participating in these projects are members of this 
Organisation, therefore discussing them here is both justified and timely. The 
intensifying contacts between the BSEC members, including those at the 
highest level, give us hope that the Organisation will make its due 
contribution to the stability in the Black Sea area and will not permit any 
shadow of doubt, regardless of how small, to be cast on the safety and 
economic viability of these globally important projects.  
 
Soon, the transportation of huge volumes of Caspian hydrocarbons via the 
Caucasus will begin within the framework of the New Silk Road. The 
movement of cargo and people will increasingly grow. Already we see signs 
in Georgia of dramatic growth in tourism which is an important source of 
income for our country. All this necessitates closer and more active 
cooperation in the matters of regional stability. 
  
Under conditions where major international organisations are preoccupied 
with hot spots across the globe, they do not always give due attention to the 
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affairs of the Caucasus. This is why shared responsibility over the fate of the 
region must become one of our principal goals in this Organisation. Please 
do not interpret my words as a call for expanding the political dimension of 
BSEC at the cost of its economic activities. But you will perhaps concur that 
an increasing threat to the regional stability prompts us to think in this 
direction as well.  
 
Perhaps the time is ripe for BSEC to strike an appropriate balance between 
economic cooperation and cooperation on regional security, and determine 
its place within the family of other regional alliances and intergovernmental 
organisations in the new European architecture of the 21st century. These 
issues are increasingly relevant and BSEC's ultimate success depends on 
them.  
 
Many BSEC members aspire to a step by step integration into the European 
Union. With this in mind, the relations between BSEC and the EU acquire 
special significance. The establishment by the EU Council of Ministers of 
the BSEC-EU Co-operation Platform, which has already been approved by 
the Council of Foreign Ministers of BSEC, will provide a solid legal 
foundation for these relations. In this respect, BSEC is to identify and 
develop specific projects for collaboration with the European Union.  
 
The mutually agreed legal frames provide us with an opportunity to adopt 
within the framework of BSEC, not only recommendations, but also binding 
decisions. Delay in this respect is inadmissible. Next year, a representative 
from Georgia will assume the position of the BSEC General Secretary. This 
individual will spare no effort to ensure that the Organisation's activities are 
effective and fruitful. The Georgian government will give him full support 
and help. 
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Annex H: Summary of the agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Ireland, signed at Belfast, 10 April 1998 
 
Two sovereign states: United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, both 
members of EU. 
 
Sovereignty: Future sovereignty of Northern Ireland (NI), i.e. participation in 
either UK or Republic of Ireland) to be determined by referendum of people 
of NI (this is now recognised in British law and Irish constitution). Right of 




1) NI Executive is accountable to a directly elected Assembly 
  very strong human rights safeguards and minority protections 
  10 ministerial departments  
    Agriculture and Rural Development 
    Culture, Arts and Leisure 
    Education; Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
  Environment;  Finance  and  Personnel 
    Health, Social Services and Public Safety 
    Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment 
  Regional  Development 
  Social  Development 
2) Northern Ireland Office (branch of UK national government) retains 
responsibility for constitutional and security issues, in particular law & order, 
policing and criminal justice policy. Also three agencies: NI Prison Service, 
Compensation Agency and Forensic Science Agency. 
 
Sharing of sovereignty 
1) North/South Ministerial Council - NI Executive and Irish cabinet to meet 
as equals. 
  Joint implementation of policy on: 
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  inland  waterways 
  food  safety   
  special  EU  programmes   
    minority languages (i.e. Irish/Gaelic and Ulster Scots) 
  coastal  waters 
    trade and business development  
  commitment to co-operate on: 
  transport   
  agriculture   
  education 
  health   
  environment  - 
  tourism 
2) British-Irish Council (BIC) (also known as  “Council of the Isles” - 
modeled on Nordic Council) 
  British and Irish governments,  
  devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales,  
  representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. 
  An assembly for dialogue, rather like the Balkan Stability Pact 
3) British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
  regular summit meetings between British and Irish governments  




All participants to work for paramilitary disarmament by May 2000 (!) 
British government commits to reform policing and criminal justice system 
Both governments commit to release prisoners 
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Annex I: Bosnia and Herzegovina - immediate urgent post-war 
reconstruction costs 
 
Population of BiH pre-war was 4.5 million, of whom at least half were 
displaced during 1992-95 war, and at least 250,000 were killed. Pre-war 
GDP was $10.6 billion, $2,400 per capita 
 
Total cost requirements of the Priority Reconstruction Program endorsed by 
the donor community just after Dayton (early 1996) came to $5.1 billion. 
This divides as follows: 
 
a)  Reconstruction of physical assets: $3.3 billion 
i)  Network infrastructure $1.3 billion 
1)  Transport $542 million 
2)  Telecommunications $134 million 
3)  Electric Power and Coal $623 million 
ii)  Community revival $1.4 billion 
1)  Water and Sanitation $350 million 
2)  District Heat and gas $166 million 
3)  Housing $710 million 
4)  Landmine Clearing $170 million 
iii)  Social sectors $0.6 billion 
1)  Health $340 million 
2)  Education $275 million 
b)  Restart of economic activity: $1.1 billion 
i)  Industry and finance $593 million 
ii)  Agriculture $260 million 
iii)  Employment generation $225 million 
c)  Building and strengthening institutions/initiating the policy reforms of 
transition: $0.7 billion 
Original estimates were so heavily revised that it is better to use actual 
expenditures as follows: 
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i)  Fiscal/government support inc. balance of payments support 
$485 million 
ii)  Social Protection $163 million 
iii)  Transition technical assistance $37 million 
d)  Peace implementation – was not included in the PRP but actual 
expenditure was $320 million. 
 
Reconstruction of physical assets 
 
Network infrastructure $1.3 billion 
Transport $542 million 
2000 km of road needed immediate repair 
70 bridges had to be reconstructed 
all bridges between BiH and Croatia were destroyed 
all railway lines were rendered inoperable 
Sarajevo airport was partly destroyed and closed to civilian traffic 
no maintenance of infrastructure for 4 years 
 
Telecommunications $134 million 
224,000 subscriber lines – almost a third – were destroyed 
call completion rate dropped from 38% to less than 2% 
international lines decreased from 4,000 to 400 
fixed lines penetration dropped from 15% to 12% 
pre-war network split into three 
need to digitalize network 
 
Electric Power and Coal $623 million 
more than half of electrical generating capacity out of commission 
most of the electricity transmission network and control system severely 
damaged 
electricity distribution network likewise 
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whole electricity network split into three 
coal production dropped from 18 million tons to 1.5 million tons 
most mobile mining equipment damaged beyond repair 
“improper mining operations” caused “overburden removal problems” 
no maintenance of mining equipment 
 
Community revival $1.4 billion 
 
Water and Sanitation $350 million 
water leakage increased to 50% (from already high 30% pre-war) 
in Federation 40% of population did not have 24 hour water supply 
everywhere lack of maintenance of water and sewage systems 
landfill sites unusable due to landmine threat 
whole system well below European environmental standards 
revenue collection system needed restructuring 
 
District Heat and Gas $166 million 
heating system in Sarajevo damaged by direct shelling 
gas system in Sarajevo massively increased with improvised, unsafe 
connections 
everywhere lack of maintenance 
revenue collection system needed restructuring 
 
Housing $710 million 
over 1 million refugees and 1.2 million internally displaced persons 
in Federation, 33% of housing stock damaged and 6% destroyed 
in Republika Srpska, 29% of housing stock damaged and 5% destroyed 
overcrowding everywhere 
 
Landmine Clearing $170 million 
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17,000 registered minefields throughout country 
 
Social sectors $0.6 billion 
 
Health $340 million 
health sector finance collapsed 
loss of health professionals (40-50%) 
200,000 people (inc. 50,000 children) wounded 
13,000 people with permanent disabilities (inc. 5,000 who lost limbs) 
incidence of communicable diseases increased two- to five-fold 
doubled infant mortality 
35-50% of health infrastructure damaged or destroyed 
35% of hospital bed capacity lost 
shortages of drugs and supplies 
 
Education $275 million 
60% of all school buildings damaged or destroyed 
teaching force decimated 
educational funding ceased for three years 
need for textbooks and teacher training 
need for curriculum reform 
need for policy support 
   
Source: BiH 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments: Review of the 
Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program and Looking Ahead towards 
Sustainable Economic Development (European Commission and World 
Bank, May 1999) 
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Annex J: Kosovo: “A programme for Reconstruction and recovery”, EU 
Commission and World Bank, in support of UNMIK, November 1999 
 
                      External Financing Requirements for Kosovo (in US$ million) 
 












Agriculture  8  86 94 141  235 
Private  Sect.  Dev./Industry  16  104 120 110 230 
Institutions  15  35 50 50 100 
Housing  36  270 306 214 520 
Water and Waste  30  49  79  181  260 
Landmine-Clearing  7  14 21 9  30 
Education  11  38 49 36 85 
Health  16  24 40 45 85 
Telecommunications  15  26 41 54 95 
Energy 51  78  129  281  410 
Transport  12  57 69 96 165 
Subtotal  217  781 998 1,217  2,215 
Budgetary Support  68  60  128  TBD  TBD 
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Annex K: Members of the CEPS Task Force for the Caucasus 
 
Dr. Terry Adams, former President of the Azerbaijan Oil Company 
Sergiu Celac, Ambassador at large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 
Co-Chair 
Professor Bruno Coppieters, Free University of Brussels 
Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Co-Chair 
Alexander Liono, Danish Institute for International Relations, Copenhagen 
Professor Jean Radvanyi, Observatoire des Etats post-Sovietiques, Paris 
Nathalie Tocci, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Rapporteur 
Marius Vahl, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Professor Thomas Waelde, Centre for Energy, Petrololeum, Mineral Law and 
Policy, University of Dundee  
Dr. Nicholas Whyte, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
 
Collaboration with: 
Dr. Oksana Antonenko, Institute for International Strategic Studies, London 
Sergei Arutuinov, Department of Caucasian Studies, Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow 
Yuri Borko, Institute of Europe, Moscow  
Robert M. Cutler, Institute of European and Russian Studies, Carleton 
University, Ottawa 
Igor Leshukov, Centre for Analysis of Integration, St. Petersburg 
Abbas Maleki, International Institute for Caspian Studies, Tehran 
Anna Matveeva, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London 
 
The Task Force appreciates having been able to read a so far unpublished 
analysis of Professor Gareth Winrow of University of Istanbul. 
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he Caucasus region has become one of the world’s most tragic humanitarian, political and 
economic disaster zones. Governments and clan leaders are embroiled in a complex set of 
linked conflicts. In the south, the conflict situations are deadlocked. In the north, the new war in 
Chechnya has been fought at terrible cost in human suffering, but the peace is far from won. The 
political leaders of the region call for some kind of security or stability pact, without specifying what 
or how. In the absence of common membership in international organisations such as the OSCE, there 
has been a slide into sets of opposing virtual alliances involving the great powers, which discourages 
regional leaders from reaching solutions. The region is entering the 21
st century still drinking the 
deadly cocktail of 19
th century nationalism and great power rivalry. The insecurity of the region also 
blocks the development of the wider Caucasus-Black Sea-Caspian-Central Asian economic axis. 
T 
A fresh, comprehensive strategy for the whole of the region is indeed needed to break out of the 
deadlock, and bring the region into the norms and structures of modern Europe and the international 
community. A huge political and diplomatic effort is needed to complete the shift of paradigms – 
“from the 19
th century to the 21
st century” – with new regional cooperation and integration structures. 
The Caucasus is not the Balkans, however, in spite of some similarities, which is why something 
different from the Balkan Stability Pact is needed. The pay-off from a comprehensive solution in 
terms of economic and societal welfare could be enormous, compared to the disastrous status quo. The 
political renewal in Russia also marks an opportunity for fresh initiative. 
A coherent set of political initiatives could turn the trends, consisting of: 








formation of a contact group of 8 principal actors, to sketch the agenda, 
settlement of existing conflicts, 
initiation of a South Caucasus Community,  
negotiation of a regional security agreement under OSCE, 
Russia/EU/US “Southern Dimension” cooperation, 
a boost to Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation, and 
optimisation of oil and gas development. 
 
Together these could make a Stability Pact for the Caucasus. 